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HYBRIDS, RIGHTS AND THEIR PROLIFERATION
Lynda Birke and Mike Michael
Introduction
Working out the concept of rights is a complicated business, which at
least keeps philosophers occupied. Not so long ago, one of us would
have been denied the right to vote, on the grounds of her gender. Yet
now, at the turn of the millennium, she is far from sure that we have
come very far on the question of women's rights. And if women, or
minorities, or anyone else who is human can sometimes be denied rights,
then how much more likely that non-humans will be?
Yet extending the concept of rights to non-human animals is increasingly
being taken seriously. It is debated in academic journals, and forms the
basis for a growing activism. The publication of books arguing in favour
of extending rights to at least some animals has proliferated.1 But the
idea also has its critics. Some criticisms come from those who simply
wish to keep nonhuman animals out of any moral or political agenda.2
The starting point of this article is the critique of the idea of rights, from
the perspective of those who are animal advocates3; in particular, we
start from the premise that the concept of 'rights' is too rooted in
idealisation of the individual and autonomy. Such idealisation can be
found in claims about nonhuman animals. But, we would argue, this
marginalises any concept of relationality. In discussing relationality, we
aim to address the ways in which relations between human and
nonhuman animals are embedded in broader networks of inter-relations
(that range from the evolutionary to the local and cultural). Those
relations are also a product of the heterogeneous forms of
communication between individual human and animal, especially in the
case of companion animals.
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We want, however, to do more than simply acknowledge relationality;
we also want to suggest that it can serve as another basis for warranting,
advocating, particular positive relationships with animals. That is to say,
we aim to provide a narrative - contrasted to that of 'rights' - that
prioritises our interrelations with animals in such a way that to harm
'them' would be to harm 'ourselves'. So, while we might be sympathetic
to studies of the human-animal relationship, we would see these as
assuming from the outset discrete humans and animals, whereas we are
aiming to reach a position where we can 'assume at outset' the
relationality of humans and animals.4
What we want to pursue here is the question of relationality. Other
authors have noted the importance of relationships and contexts. Ted
Benton for example, argues that the social context of both human and
nonhuman cannot be ignored, while Freya Matthews insists that we
recognise the commensality of humans and nonhumans.5 We, Matthews
points out, need animal company; but nature - animals- can benefit from
our company, too. This is not to deny the existence of appalling abuses
of animals, she argues, but rather acknowledges the mutuality of many
human/animal interactions. Similarly Barbara Noske6 argues that our
society is partly based on its relation to, and exploitation of, animals. In
this paper, we draw upon a quite different literature: we turn to recent
work in the sociology of scientific knowledge as a starting point. In
particular, we draw on the work of Bruno Latour, and his analyses of
'hybrids'.7 We extend this idea to thinking about two examples of human
relationship and communication with companion animals - with dogs,
and with horses. These relationships, we argue, can be thought about as
instances of hybrids, a concept that sees them as more than the sum of
the parts. We argue that thinking in terms of hybrids of
human/nonhuman can be useful in enabling us to move beyond some of
the problems of individualism that beset debates about rights.
In doing so, we are not making claims for all nonhuman animals
(although others might wish to extend the analysis further); indeed, we
offer this paper very much as a preliminary exploration. Nor are we
seeking to undermine the spirit of animal rights philosophy. On the
contrary, we are committed to it, but do not find it enough.
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Right is Wrong?
There have been a number of critics of the philosophy of animal rights indeed, of the concept of rights more generally. Perhaps one of the
strongest criticisms is that notions of rights rely on a profound separation
and individuality, as well as prioritising rationality. Benton8 notes, for
instance, the basis of our understanding, and the idealisation of certain
rights in the eighteenth century. He points out that while freedom from
arrest, and freedom of association were specified, the rights of health,
bodily integrity, nutrition, and so on, were not. This was, moreover, the
period of history when our modern separation of nature from culture was
consolidated; it was the sphere of the 'natural' that was omitted from
these idealised rights - the needs of the body, and the nonhuman world.
Additionally, Benton reminds us of the ways that notions of rights tend
to obscure 'the social-relational preconditions' for the emergence of the
'human individual' as bearer of rights, and with particular qualities,
attributes and abilities 'in virtue of which they are held to have inherent
value'.9 'Rights', resting as they do upon some version of individualism,
neglect the many ways in which our experiences are situated.10
Another point needs to be made. The ideas concerning rights have
'acquired an exaggerated importance as part of the prestige of the public
sphere and the masculine, and the emphasis on separation and autonomy,
on reason and abstraction'.11 Separation and autonomy are defined,
against others - be they nonhuman animals, an ill-defined 'nature', or
particular excluded groups of human others. It is through this process of
exclusion against, that feminism becomes linked to environmental and
animal causes: women, nature and nonhuman animals can, in different
ways and at different times, become others to the story of separation.
Plumwood argues instead for a form of relationality, which, she reminds
us, is not the same as the identification with nature sometimes implied in
writing about deep ecology (too close an identification may blind us to
understanding an other's suffering).12 Nonhuman animals have their own
societies, but they are also - deeply - in relationship with other animal
kinds, including humans. In different ways, they are in relationship to
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human societies (although there is a world of difference between the
'domestic animals', socialised into human societies, and the relationship
of a wild species to humanity).
Relations with nonhumans: Introducing Hybrids
The word 'hybrid' has many meanings. It can denote a deliberately bred
cross between, say, two plant species; it might conjure up 'hybrid vigour'.
Or, it might carry meanings of illicit mixtures, or something defiled by
being less pure.
The sense of 'hybrid' that we use here draws on the notion of hybrid
introduced by Bruno Latour, in his work on technoscience. In a recent
book, Bruno Latour describes what he considers to be two practices
central to modernity. On the one hand, there is 'translation', which
'creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature
and culture'.13 On the other, there is also 'purification', the process by
which we keep humans separated off from nonhumans. Modern Western
culture tends towards the latter, even while busily creating new mixtures
(sometimes literally, as in the case of genetically engineered organisms).
One problem with the animal rights position, following Latour, is that the
concept of rights, while apparently denying separation from other animal
kinds is firmly rooted in it. All it seems to do is to move the goalposts, to
allow some kinds of animals onto the pitch. Life, meanwhile, is awfully
crowded in the stands and onlookers are policed to stop them invading.
But it is precisely because of that history of purification that the practice
of sociology or anthropology has ignored all else but human-human
relationships.14 Not surprisingly then, we are unused to thinking about
all the nonhuman things that contribute to our world, forming chains of
associations (that are both material and semiotic) with humans and other
nonhumans. These are part of our social organisation, behind-the-scenes
contributors - though of course 'social' becomes a misnomer in this
context for what we see are 'orderings'15 made up of heterogeneous
elements. Expanding on this idea, Bruno Latour makes the point that
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We are never faced with objects or social relations, we
are faced with chains which are associations of humans (H)
and nonhumans (NH). No-one has ever seen a social relation
by itself...nor a technical relation...Instead we are
always faced with chains which look like this H-NH-H-NH-HNH...16
The 'nonhuman' here may mean a technical artefact; thus, our
communication with you, the reader, depends upon technological
relationships, a complex array of computers, software, and international
institutions. But, we want to argue, 'nonhuman' can also mean nonhuman
animals.
Breaking the boundaries of what counts as human usually results in a
rush to demonstrate the ways in which animals are not rational, are not
self-aware, are not intelligent, and so on. Separating ourselves off from
'nature' characterises the modern period, Latour argues. But the study of
society or culture has itself developed out of that separation, and it
specifically excludes all nonhuman influence - be that inanimate or
animate. Animals, plants, technical artefacts - all belong to the realm of
the nonsocial; they can be left to be studied by people (scientists) who
themselves deny the existence of the social in the descriptions they
themselves make of the nonsocial. Yet isn't the existence of 'society'
itself crossing the boundary, depending as it does on much more than
merely human-human relationships?
Latour's work rests on actor-network theory. Put briefly, this seeks to
map out complex networks of humans and nonhumans. The world of
actor-network theory is partly ruled by the generalized 'principle of
symmetry' that Bruno Latour and Michel Callon17 have advocated. In
essence, this principle rejects any a priori distinctions between the
human and the nonhuman, agent and object, the social and the natural or
the technological (such distinctions are all too often simply assumed,
they point out). Thus, what is to count as 'human' or 'natural' or
'technological' is a matter of struggle between various actors such as
scientists, policy makers, lay publics and the like. One relevant example
of this would be current debates about the moral status of the great apes;
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there is ongoing political struggle over whether they might be 'counted'
as animals (part of nature) or at least partly be admitted to the realm of
the human.18
It is, then, a matter of empirical investigation as to what has emerged as
'natural', 'artificial' or 'cultural'. More recently, Latour has elaborated this
view19 to argue that human and nonhumans alike are interfused with all
manner of nonhumans and humans (the network). Such heterogeneity is
characteristic of the modern condition (indeed, all conditions). Despite
our best modernist efforts at denying the 'exchange of properties'
between - that is, purifying - humans and nonhumans, this heterogeneous
process of mingling continues apace. What makes this theory different
from many others is its insistence that nonhuman - technological and
'natural' - are present in the production of every 'ordering' of relations.
We are always comprising hybrids, temporary or less temporary
associations with a vast array of nonhumans.
So, if we are to describe a person's relationship to her dog in these terms,
then we must speak not only of the human-and-the-dog, but also of the
other 'allies' that influence that relationship. Whatever other networks she
engages in, Lynda is also 'enrolled' into certain networks by the dogs she
lives with. This includes the dogleads and their manufacturers (see
below), the producers of dog food, dog beds and canine distemper
vaccine, veterinary surgeons - not to mention the resident cat. To put it in
terms of hybrids: the hybrid 'Lynda-dog-lead-dog' is constituted through
and depends upon these various networks. This, of course, is no different
from the production of 'human individuals' who are an effect of those
networks that poststructuralists have deconstructed. We shall return to
the nature of these networks below.
Relationalities and Animals
There has recently been an upsurge in writing about the 'human-animal
relationship'. New books and journals appear, marking this out as a new
area of study. That focus is certainly welcome, and makes a refreshing
change from the assumption that animals are completely separate from
us. Yet, perusing the contents of those journals is sometimes
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disappointing. What we find are examples of animals bringing benefits to
humans, in hospitals, in our homes, to children, to disabled people.
Some articles may tell us of how human contact can benefit animals
(usually companion animals); but very few speak of the relationship
between the two. In what follows, we will explore two examples in order
to explicate this 'relationality'. But before we embark upon this, a little
theoretical gloss is in order, if only to clarify what we are attempting to
do as we switch registers from the local (personal) interactions between
humans and animals to evolutionary relations.
What is a human? The production of humans relies on particular
techniques, practices, discourses - what Rose20 calls 'subjectifying
technologies'. These include what Rose refers to as the psy disciplines
(psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis), though many
other practices and technologies also shape 'the human'. The psy
disciplines, for example, help to give coherence to the notion of a unitary
individual, as well as contributing to the values and interests that are
invested in such a figure.
What we are attempting here, albeit tentatively, is to do something
similar for another character - the human-animal hybrid. So, rather than
accept the ideas of individualism and rights, we can write a different
story, that contributes to a concept of human-nonhuman hybridity. We
could begin, for instance, by pointing to how this figure/character/actor
is grounded in, and emerges out of, the evolutionary history of
domestication, or to various pre- and pro-scriptions regarding how such
human/nonhuman hybrids should behave.
If we thus begin by assuming human/animal relationality - or the
existence of the hybrid - then we can speak in terms of the co-production
and mutual emergence of humans and animals. To discriminate against
the latter, becomes akin to discriminating against the former, for these,
indeed, cannot be separated. With this overview in mind, let us proceed
with storying our hybrid.
Speaking for - or otherworldly conversations?
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Animal companions, or pets, have long been known to have therapeutic
effects upon their owners. In particular, owners claim that 'their animals
are sensitive to their (the owners') moods and feelings'.21 The processes
of communication that are evident here are clearly not linguistic, but
vocal, visual and tactile. However, animals' lack of linguistic ability may
be one of their prime assets in that animals cannot, as a consequence
judge, betray or criticise - their feelings for the human are apparently
uncontingent. But this intimacy does not preclude humans from 'speaking
for' their animal companions. As Sanders notes:
Because the animal is 'mute', caretakers often find
themselves in situations in which they must 'speak for'
their nonhuman companions. In so doing, they make use of
a rich body of knowledge derived from an intimate
understanding of the animal-other built up in the course of
day-to-day interactional experience. Dog owners commonly
give voice to what they perceive to be their animals'
mental, emotional, and physical experiences.22
Such patterns of 'speaking for' suggests a process of retelling, by humans,
of their own and animals' experiences with the aid of more or less
familiar stories. But that does not mean we should not take them
seriously.
Indeed, we would argue that there is a serious problem with a sociology
which persistently ignores animal others, for it remains rooted in the
persistent dualism of nature and culture. Many animal 'others' are deeply
integral to human societies - indeed, as Benton argues23, they are partly
constitutive of our society in many ways. But understanding this does
not mean that we have to objectify them, or even to accord them human
status (as seems to be implied in some formulations of rights). Feminist
historian of science Donna Haraway, reflecting on these issues, suggests
that:
The last thing 'they' (animals) need is human subject
status, in whatever cultural-historical form... We need
other terms of conversations with animals, a much less
respectable undertaking. The point is not new
representations, but new practices, other forms of life
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rejoining humans and nothumans.24
Out of this emerges, Haraway hopes, a new form of human being:
Once the world of subjects and objects is put into
question, that paradox concerns the congeries, or curious
confederacy, that is the self, as well as selves' relations
with others. A promising form of life, conversation defies
the autonomization of the self, as well as the
objectification of the other.24
So, what happens as we engage in those non-linguistic conversations
with animal others is a diffusion of the (human) self. The human identity
that emerges from these conversations is no longer linear, but is realised
through all forms of communication. We want to emphasise that that
process must include nonverbal communications, with nonhuman
actors.25
We might say that animals are mute only if we remain deaf. As Kath
Smart has shown26, dogbreeders believe themselves to be in conversation
with their animals, and sometimes even under scrutiny or surveillance - a
perception familiar to anyone who works closely with animals in similar
ways. That perception implies an agency, that the dogs are somehow
enrolling the humans into the association. The idea that there is coagency between (some) nonhuman animals and humans is not, of course,
new to animal trainers and breeders. But it is not part of the descriptions
of the world to be found in academic disciplines; there, the purification
of human culture - to which Latour refers - is endemic. Humans have
their own society; animals belong to the other side of a heavily policed
boundary (within the natural sciences).
But the boundaries tend to break down, as Latour emphasised (see note
7). For example, in contrast to the familiar story that humans
'domesticated' dogs in prehistory, Budiansky27 contends that animals
such as dogs 'chose' us. They were, he suggests, drawn to human
communities, to the shelter, food and protection they might offer. In that
case, the domestication of dogs 'is an evolutionary phenomenon rather
than a human invention'. Dogs, we might say, have a long history of
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enrolling humans, just as we have one with them. Both have adapted to
each other, and both are (sometimes) in deeply mutual communication.
Here, we have a story that crosses the boundary of 'natural science'
(evolution, animals) and 'sociology' (human society).
One way in which human-dog communication is manifest occurs when
we observe a person 'taking her dog for a walk'. Usually, this involves a
technological artefact - the doglead. This object, however, mediates
exchanges between the human and dog, and blurs the site of agency.
Who is the user - human or dog? Who does the configuring - animal,
lead, or human? For example, dogs may have their own agendas;
sometimes, these fit with human agendas - sometimes, they do not, as is
often the case with Lynda and her three dogs-plus-dogleads. Agency, in
that case, is a complicated business.
Dogs, indeed, may resist human desires (witness the reluctance to enter
the veterinary surgery, or the desire to jump off the table once there). But
even when they cooperate, agency is evident. In other words, dogs may
be committed to a certain 'contract' and will bring their 'handlers' into
line. But also, the fulfilment and maintenance of the contract is
continuously performed through communication, at many levels,
between human and dog.
This process of negotiation is partly conducted through the medium of
the doglead - especially so in urban areas,28 where it is the hybrid of
human-doglead-dog who must negotiate the tricky terrain. The doglead
then permits a mutuality - both human and dog look out for objects or
events on the other's behalf. In some cases, the dog's agency is more
prominent, as is the case with guide dogs. Stories abound among those
working with 'service animals' of the animal acting heroically (leaping
under the wheels of a sliding wheelchair, for instance) - agency, indeed.
We turn now to another example - that of human/horse interactions.
Again, the popular image is one of humans using and dominating horses
(as exemplified in the rather misleading phrase, to break a horse). Partly
for that reason, there are some in the animal rights movement who
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consider that it is morally wrong to ride horses. But this position again
plays down any mutuality.
Here, the 'hybrid' we might describe consists of human-bridle-horse.
Communication between the two living entities takes place partly
through the medium of the bridle or halter, and partly kinaesthetically through movement and its sensing. As with dogs, there is a continuous
subtle play of conversation: for horses are large animals and cannot be
dominated (even very small ones, like Shetland ponies, can beat puny
human strength). They will, however, agree to converse.
Now it is also true that there are many, many instances of abuse by
humans - a breaking of the contract, as it were. Such acts may, in part,
reflect a belief in domination. But to what extent can humans truly
dominate an animal, especially if it is the size of many horses? On the
contrary, 'learning to ride' means not only acquiring certain physical
skills, but also learning a new, largely tactile, language. Through that
means, we can communicate with the horse. But the horse also has
agency; it can - easily - refuse to work with us. Certainly, if a horse does
not want to go over a jump, it will not - just as it will show agency by
resistance if, say, a human mishandles the intervening technology (by
grabbing at the reins and hurting the horse's mouth).
There are certainly some among animal rights activists who believe that
it is morally wrong to 'make' horses jump obstacles - especially in
contexts where there is a risk of injury. There have, as a result, been
demonstrations at several international equestrian events. Whatever the
merits of their claim, it is somewhat ironic that demonstrations focus on
the 'showpiece' events, for it is there that the 'hybrids' are policed most
strongly. The literature of the 'horse world' relies on a rhetoric of
welfare, in which the horse's needs are paramount.29 Human-bridle-horse
hybrids must follow particular rules, at least in public arenas. To an
extent, the horse takes part in this rule-following.
Domestic animals, such as dogs and horses, are socialised into a society.
By that we mean not only their own society (the local community of dogs
at the breeders, or the horses at the stud), but also into human society.
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What we should perhaps be insisting on, indeed, is a notion of a hybrid
society, consisting of humans along with nonhumans. Just like a human
infant, a young animal must be socialised into that hybrid society: both
kinds of infants must 'learn the rules' about other members of society.
Part of the prevailing view that nonhuman animals are domesticated by
us is the claim that, underneath the veneer of domestication, there is a
'wild' animal, driven by archaic instincts. This additive view, of the thin
veneer of culture overlaying baser wildness, fails to address the social
embeddedness of domestic animals.
Yet we project our social
expectations onto domestic animals, and sometimes they behave
accordingly. For example, within the world of 'horse people' (a curiously
hybrid phrase, to be sure!), there are many humans who will avoid mares,
in the belief that they are less 'trainable'; stallions, too, are often thought
to be 'difficult'. Yet - if true - how much of that is due to human
expectations and to socialisation? If humans socialise the animal into a
role of being 'difficult' (that is, less susceptible to mutual
communication), then that is what it will become. So, too, may human
children.
Returning to the theme of animal rights, we have argued that one
important problem with rights is its emphasis on individuality, rather
than relationality. This in turn is deeply entwined with the historically
contingent separation of 'nature' from 'culture' in the West. That
separation then excludes the place of (at least some) animals in society
and culture, and their interests in maintaining that place.
The problems of the ways that animals may be treated today by humans
arise in large part from their relegation to the (inferior) world of nature.
That is not to say that prior to the modern period, animals were treated
well; they were not. But a characteristic of modernity is the deep anxiety
to police the boundaries of human culture (or even of Western culture);
as Latour puts it (note 7), we are obsessed with purification. One
manifestation of this is our constant need in the West to return nonhuman
animals to their 'place' in nature. Because of this, we tend to have
difficulties with those nonhuman animals whose place is by our sides;
are they in nature, or do they belong to culture?
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Yet the very same culture so preoccupied with purifying its boundaries
also works to transgress them. Science, for example, does both. The
practice of science assumes a separation from nature (hence the supposed
objective stance, by which scientists claim to 'know' nature, while
denying their own cultural contingencies); but simultaneously, it denies
separation (evolutionary theory and genetics) and even creates boundarycrossing organisms (hybrids and chimeras abound in the new age of
biotechnology).
Concluding Remarks
Our use of the idea of hybrids is deliberate. We are not necessarily
advocating a literal interbreeding of people and other animals (which is
another debate). Rather, we want to use the concept of hybridity for two
related reasons. The first is that the notion of a hybrid implies boundarycrossing and mixing - if not literally, then certainly at a conceptual level.
This confounds issues of what is human? or what is animal? or even
what is an individual? At the very least, that confounding should help to
destabilise that tired old division between nature and culture.
Hybrids also open up a space, secondly, to think about relationality. Now
we have used the term hybrid to emphasise the conjoint nature of the
hybrid, and its co-agency.
As critics of the nature/culture or
nature/nurture dualisms have often bewailed, it is all too easy to invoke
some kind of addition (nurture adds onto the nature base), or a simple
interaction (A can affect B, which can affect A30). But even this can still
be split apart - indeed, that splitting is often required by the very methods
by which we might study something. So, we might choose to study 'the
human/dog relationship' as a function of doggy effects on humans (such
as reduction of heart rate if you go patting a dog), or perhaps of human
effects on dogs (selective breeding, say).
Yet what is missing from, or played down by, this kind of account is the
mutuality; both human and dog become changed, and become more than
simple person-plus-dog. By trying to think about this chimerical being as
a hybrid, we want to emphasise that 'more than'. Lynda is a part of many
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human networks, but also at times comes together with dogs and horses
to create temporary hybrids: these, in turn, generate other networks of
humans and nonhumans.
One extreme position we have encountered among animal rights activists
is the idea that it is wrong to 'keep pets', that the animals should be free
to wander and to 'be themselves', that they have intrinsic rights to
freedom. But in this specific case - companion animals - such a stance
would deny their relationships with humans. It is also based on a highly
idealised notion of 'freedom', for who among us humans has such
freedom? Aren't we all constrained by, among other things, our
relationships with other beings? Invoking individual 'rights' seems to
gloss over those constraints, and to ignore the very relationality on which
we (and many nonhuman animals) base our social lives.
Now in seeking to emphasise that relationality, we recognise its
limitations when it comes to other human uses of animals. We want here
to use the idea with regard to companion animals. When it comes to
intensive farming, the rhetoric of rights is probably more politically
useful; even the more liberal welfare lobby talk about ensuring that
certain animal needs are met.
The use of animals in scientific experimentation is another area where to
insist on at least some rights may be a useful political strategy. Thus,
those involved in reform or working for welfare might argue that
laboratory animals have a right to a certain amount of space in their
living quarters. Even so, we should remember that the practice of using
animals itself seems to require that scientists' separate themselves off
from the animals, that they psychologically and culturally deny any
relationality. Indeed, on those occasions where laboratory animals
become individually incorporated into relationships with people (as 'lab
pets', say), then they usually are 'saved' from the experiments.31
Much modern theorising about evolution seems to stress individuality (or
even to shift it onto selfish genes). Thus, despite the appeal of Darwin's
ideas to those of us who see kindred spirits in the nonhuman world, we
inherit a cultural tendency towards atomism. Yet there are also
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evolutionary theorists who do not see such atomism in the natural world,
who emphasise instead the co-evolution of ecologically interrelated
species.32 Rather than seeing individual species or populations as rather
passively adapted to a (largely inert) environment, this reformulation
insists on mapping out the networks of interrelationships and effects.
Indeed, an animal's or a species' environment is constituted by other
organisms, including humans - hybrids aplenty.
And there, to return to Val Plumwood's analysis of ideas of nature, lies
the difficulty at the heart of rights theory. For while we might speak of
the 'rights' of animal A to roam free 'around its environment', that is to
ignore the 'rights' of other organisms. To take the oft-used example,
whose rights should we then heed, the sheep or the wolf?
We have borrowed here from the concepts of hybridity and actornetworks, developed in the literature on sociology of scientific
knowledge. Their relevance to a discussion of our relationship to animals
is twofold - they explicitly problematise the separation of nature from
culture, and they relocate humans individuals back into networks of other
actors including nonhumans. Whether we speak of events over
evolutionary time, or seek to describe human relationships with (certain)
animals now, any rhetoric of individualism is limited.
Instead, we must try to develop a relational framework, and to develop an
ethical stance from that. It is not necessarily in the best interests of
companion animals (at least) to talk of their individual 'rights to roam
free' (where?). Nor is it necessarily to deny them some intrinsic freedom
to follow their instincts - a belief which maintains the notion that
nonhuman animals are 'in nature' in ways that we are not.
Once we think in terms of hybrids between culturally specific humans,
nonhuman nature, and even technical artefacts (this, it should be noted,
could include ecosystems), then perhaps we can develop a language of
interests that apply to the hybrid. Among other things, hybrids are
conjoint entities: they are not simply one entity sitting alongside another.
As a consequence, hurting one part of a hybrid hurts the rest.33 Perhaps
this move will not always work to protect the interest of either humans or
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nonhumans.34 But, we want to insist, seeing individuals as bearers of
atomistic rights does not work well either, not least because it ignores
our collective social networks.
We need, to return to Donna Haraway's insights, to develop new forms of
conversation with nonhuman others, to explore and celebrate our joint
kinship.35 In so doing, our highly overdeveloped sense of selfhood
might begin to diminish; we might even allow a breaching of our
boundaries. Lest that sound too anthropocentric, nonhuman animals
stand to benefit; for their relationships with less egocentric and territorial
humans are likely to be more welcoming and communicative. To speak
of their 'rights' seems only to reinforce our own selves and boundaries.
Surely they - and we - deserve better than that?
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BABE : THE TALE OF THE SPEAKING MEAT; PART ll
Val Plumwood
SYNOPSIS OF PART 1: In Part 1, I suggested that the film Babe
provided a valuable context in which to discuss the replacement of the
Cartesian mechanistic model of animals, which has dominated the
industrial world since the Enlightenment, by a communicative model
which is more suited to survival in an ecological age. The film offers a
recognition of communicative virtues and characteristics as central to
both human and nonhuman forms of life, and a vision of the emergence
of communicative forms of relationship as victorious alternatives to
forms based on violence, domination and terror. Focussing on the
paradox of the speaking meat the leading character Babe represents, I
argued that one of the great strengths of the film is that it invites us to
challenge some of the blocks and erasures which support our denial of
the meat animal as a communicative subject. As Babe's drama of
recognition reveals the multiple insensitivities and denials of kinship that
are part of the meaning of meat in our society, we can grasp the
possibility of alternative meanings that recognise food as kin. I outlined
a context-sensitive approach to vegetarianism which refuses cultural
universalism and recognises the radically different ethical meanings meat
can have in different societies. Finally I explored some of the ethical and
political ambiguities of communicative forms, and the tantalising
questions Babe raises about the communicative farm. Will the new
communicative paradigm be used to liberate the sheep and the other farm
animals, or merely to oppress them in more subtle and self-complicit
ways? Will the communicative animal farm stand to the mechanistic
farm as the hegemonic communicative forms of liberal democracy stand
to the more repressive forms of patriarchal-authoritarian governance they
replaced?
NOW READ ON to discover in PART 11 the moral ambiguities of the
human-animal contract, the conceptual traps of pet/meat and person
/property dualism, and why we need a politics of animal justice.
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4: Communication and Anthropomorphism
Babe's opening shot shows Babe waking in communicative interaction
with siblings, expressing sorrow at the loss of his mother and fear as he
is seized and carried away. These are all emotions we can realistically
expect real pigs to feel and express in this situation, and Babe's 'human'
speech as it emerges in this context seems a natural expression of these
emotions, wishes and beliefs. The animal communication introduced here
works well because it continues and extends the normal body language
and communication of the animals. Nevertheless, the representation of
such animal subjectivity in human terms is often said to be irresolutely
problematic and invalidly 'anthropomorphic'. It is worth considering and
clarifying this charge in relation to the representation of animal
communication and subjectivity in works of art. I will argue that there is
no good basis for the general claim that an artwork is invalidated by
anthropomorphism merely on the ground that it attributes subjectivity
and communication to nonhumans. The problems in representing other
species' communicative powers or subjectivities in terms of human
speech are real, but they do not rule out such representation in any
general way, and they pale before the difficulties of failing to represent
them at all, or before the enormity of representing communicative and
intentional beings as beings lacking all communicative and mental
capacity. That is a much greater inaccuracy and injustice than any
anthropomorphism could be.
We need to distinguish various senses of anthropomorphism, including
general and specific senses. The general concept and charge of
anthropomorphism, as Mary Midgley1 has argued, is in its usual sense
and definition thoroughly confused. It is ambiguous as between
attributing to nonhumans characteristics humans have (OED), and
attributing to nonhumans characteristics only humans have. Both senses
are problematic, in slightly different ways, when used to support the
claim that the attribution of characteristics such as subjectivity to animals
must be anthropomorphic.
The first sense, that something is
anthropomorphic if it attributes to animals characteristics humans have,
implies that there is no overlap of characteristics between humans and
nonhuman animals. That is, it assumes a hyperseparation of human and
animal natures and attempts to enforce upon legitimate representations of
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nonhumans such a radical discontinuity. This sense should clearly be
rejected, not only because it is based on a demonstrably false assumption
of radical discontinuity, but because it can be used to delegitimate
virtually any depiction of nonhuman subjectivity that made sense to us.
The second sense of anthropomorphism - attributing to nonhumans
characteristics only humans have - is not open to this objection, but is
open to the objection that its use to delegitimate the attribution of
subjectivity and other contested characteristics to nonhumans is simply
question-begging. It assumes just what is at issue, what opponents of the
mechanistic model contest, that nonhumans do not have characteristics
such as subjectivity and intentionality humans also possess. As Midgley
notes, the focus of this sense of the concept tends to be otiose and
human-centred. If something is to be faulted for attributing to
nonhumans characteristics they do not have, it is sufficient to point out
that this is an inaccurate way of representing them, and the inaccuracy
itself provides (in a suitably veridical context) sufficient independent
ground for rejecting such an attribution. Unless there is a good reason
for addressing the question of similarity to humans, it is simply
anthrocentric to go on to bring every source of comparison and focus of
assessment back to humans and to an animal's similarity or difference
from them, as the concept of anthropomorphism tends to do.
The critic of representing animals in communicative terms often draws
on another sense of anthropomorphism which is closely analogous to the
concept of weak anthrocentrism2, and which, like weak anthrocentrism,
makes it very hard or impossible for representations of nonhumans to
avoid being assigned the label anthropomorphism. This is a weak sense
which locates anthropomorphism in the presentation of animal
communication 'in human terms', from a human conceptual location. Any
representation of the speech-content for a human audience will have to
be an interpretation in terms of human concepts, and in that weak sense,
a background level of anthropomorphism is always likely to be present.
What is much more difficult to demonstrate is that anthropomorphism of
this background kind, in the weak sense of employing a human
conceptual apparatus or conceptual location, is necessarily harmful or
invalidating, or that there are no practices which can counter it.
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Where the charge of anthropomorphism can lead to the application of
more stringent standards to the representation of animal communication
than are used to judge the success of comparable human representation, it
is itself liable to the counter-charge that it is anthrocentric. Arguments of
this kind are often advanced to show that any representation of animal
communication is rendered illegitimately anthropomorphic because of
problems of translation and indeterminacy, although problems are also
familiar in the representation of human cultural difference. There are
parallel difficulties for both cross-cultural and cross-species
representation: a weak cross-cultural analogue to background
anthropomorphism is involved in virtually any translation project, for
example, in any attempt to 'bring over' one culture's forms into another's.
To avoid delegitimating all such attempts, we need to distinguish the
impact of weaker and stronger forms of anthropo- morphism, just as we
need to distinguish weak and usually harmless forms of anthropocentrism
from strong and damaging forms.3 Weak forms are unavoidable but not
necessarily harmful, while strong forms may be damaging but are by no
means inevitable. As with anthro- centrism, the confusion between the
two forms gives rise to the illusion that damaging forms are inevitable.
Once we proceed beyond these weak general senses, the concept of
anthropomorphism is somewhat ill-defined, and the features being
problematised under that description can usually be better characterised
in terms of anthropocentrism rather than anthropomorphism. But in the
same way, the charge of anthropocentrism cannot be used in a
generalised form to delegitimate representations of nonhumans as
communicative subjects. There may still sometimes be a point to the
charge of strong anthropomorphism, but it becomes much harder to
demonstrate. As in the case of weak anthrocentrism, the question is not
whether or not some degree of humanisation of perspective is present in
any particular human representation of animal communication, for it
always will be at the background level, but how damaging it is, what is
its meaning, and what practices can be used to counter it? Since the
inevitable presence of background levels of anthromorphism means that
the charge of impurity can always be raised, it is helpful here to
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distinguish the motives for raising it. Are there ever legitimate problems
the charge points to?
We have seen that a commonplace motivation for raising the charge of
anthropomorphism is a rationalist-Cartesian policing of human-animal
discontinuity, to maintain the human observer's distance from and
indifference to the animal observed. Although there is in response to the
dominant Cartesian-rationalist stress on discontinuity often a need to
provide a counterstress on continuity between the human and animal, the
question of anthropomorphism can often be raised with some greater
validity in the context of the denial of difference which is a key part of
structures of subordination and colonisation to which animals are
subject.4 The charge of anthropomorphism may then legitimately draw
our attention to a loss of sensitivity to and respect for animal difference
in humanisation or in representation. The concern about lack of respect
for difference can extend to cover even well-meaning animal rights
attempts to assimilate animals within the model of the person, in contexts
where there has been no associated attempt to deconstruct the
person/property dualism formative of liberalism.
But there are a host of dangers in this area uneasiness about
anthropomorphism may reflect: the infantilisation of animals which their
insertion into the structures of the private household as pets or their
treatment as adjuncts to human children tends to produce is just one of
the forms of humanisation associated with the structuring of what
domestic animals can become in terms of the limiting slots available for
them in human society. The charge of humanisation can draw attention
to the reduction of the animal which appears in demeaning or
subordinated forms of humanisation. But some kinds of uneasiness
about the influence of the human are less warranted. It is only too easy
to adopt here over-strong criteria which unwittingly re-invest in humananimal dualism through the assumption that the only genuine animal is
the wild animal, the animal completely apart from and uninfluenced by
human society, (just as the only genuine indigene is one who looks and
sounds exactly as before the days of contact). The genuine problem here
is not so much human influence and relationship itself, which is not
inevitably corrupting or demeaning, but the reduction of animals which
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so often accompanies their insertion as subordinates, deviants or
resources into an anthropocentric culture. A solution does not have to try
to maintain or represent an 'ideal' pure animal uninfluenced by
interaction with the human - although every effort should be made to
maintain wild animals in their own ecosystems - but to reach out for
relationships that allow for both species together some kind of fullness of
becoming, or, as Freya Mathews puts it, allows the animal to 'achieve a
significant degree of the form of self-realisation appropriate to its
particular kind'.5 The mixed farm of Babe showed some of the
possibilities here, especially for the working dogs.
A parallel set of issues arise in the case of representation. As in the case
of the human other, so in the animal, such representations must always
raise questions about supplanting and assimilating the other. However
there can be no general argument that such cross-cultural perspectives
presenting another's viewpoint, are deceptive or illegitimate. Crossspecies representation, like cross-cultural representation, is not
automatically colonising or self-imposing, and may express motives and
meanings of sympathy, support and admiration. Rather, specific cases
have to be argued on their merits, not just in terms of the alleged
intrusion of non-indigenous or human impurities, but in terms of the
kinds of insights they present or prevent and the moral quality of their
representation.6 We need to put into place here counter-practices which
oppose colonising tendencies in these contexts.
For example,
representation should keep in mind the distinction between claiming to
be rather than to represent an other's perspective, to see or speak as the
other rather than to see or speak with the other.7 In the case of
translation and indeterminacy, counter-practices could require an effort
to note non-equivalences in forms of life and to treat difficulties about
translation as sources of uncertainty and tentativeness. Using the
problems of such an approach as a model, we might expect an
appropriate methodology for dealing with cross-species conceptual
difference and translation indeterminacy to be one which stressed
corrigibility and open expectations. Dealing with both human and
nonhuman cases of translation indeterminacy requires openness to the
other and careful, sensitive, and self-critical observation which actively
seeks to uncover perspectival and centric biases8.
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So I don't think it can be argued that Babe is lacking in proper respect for
animal difference because it represents animal subjectivity and
communication in terms of human language, any more than it can be
argued that cross-cultural translation is inevitably hegemonic.
Undoubtedly there can be great variations and moral differences here, but
again, we cannot reject as automatically colonising the mixed or impure
perspective which places a human subjectivity into an animal situation.
Indeed, as the Larsen cartoon about why dinosaurs died out
demonstrates, such 'anthropomorphic' transferences of perspective may
be not only funny but philosophically revealing, about ourselves as well
as about the other. They can enable us to enter into, if not the other's
subjectivity, the other's situation, and that can contribute to our
understanding and sympathy. Here, much depends upon the stance the
work takes towards the anthrocentrism it represents: rather than being
the bearer of an insidious and unexamined inferiorisation of the other,
the imposition of an obviously human framework may be the joke, a joke
that is partly on us, and which precisely invites reflection about human
importations.
Cross-species representations then are not necessarily but can be
unacceptably human-centred. Our civilisation is haunted by animal
images, but those images themselves are often made complicit in the
project of subordinating real animals and eliminating them from our
lives. The privileging of the representation of animals over the animals
represented is a widespread form of human-centredness which is
symptomatic of the growing success of the project of human selfenclosure. This danger is especially acute in cases like Babe where films
use living animal actors, rather than more indirect forms of
representation. The animal justice movement has been right to raise
questions about the treatment of animals actors in animal films during
and after film-making, although perhaps less right where it has ignored
the difference between the willing participation of domestic animal
actors and the coerced participation of wild animals, and insisted upon
conditions so stringent that they would prevent any participation of
domestic animals in filmic events.

27

The project of human self-enclosure and its privileging of animal
representation over animal lives is routinised in popular representations
of animality. Compare the kind of humanisation displayed in Babe with
the Disney paradigm of humanisation. Disney cartoons, as John Berger
has noted, are usually only superficially about animals; Disney characters
with stereotypical animal bodies often have totally humanised
personalities, frequently incorporate little or no recognisable reference to
the characteristics or situations of the animals represented, and are
permitted no critical reflection on their relationship to the human
community or membership of the mixed community. The animal form
appears in this anthrocentric conception as a nullity which is made to
bear the burden of meanings which have no connection with the animal's
own subjectivity or situation. The Disney paradigm, normalised in
television cartoons, is one in which animals are, in John Berger's words,
'totally transformed into human puppets' whose main role is to naturalise
various hegemonic forms of the human condition by attributing them to
the animal 'kingdom'.9
The erasure of animals in the Disney animal cartoon is objectionable for
reasons that directly reflect its anthrocentrism and its contribution to the
incorporation of the other, in this case expressed in the inability to
encounter the animal respectfully as an independent other who is more
than a disguised form of self. These movements to incorporate the other
also underlie the highly anthrocentric assumption I criticised above, that
an 'animal film' can only be taken seriously to the extent that it is actually
about humans. In contrast, a less anthrocentric and belittling treatment
would take animals seriously as agents, communicative subjects, bearers
of knowledge, and members of the mixed community who are
themselves able to observe us and perhaps to reflect critically on us and
their relationships with us. On these sorts of criteria of anthrocentrism in
the treatment of the animal other, I think 'our Babe' comes out rather
well. 'Eatin' pigs! Barbaric!' exclaims the ewe Maa when she learns of
the Hoggett's intention to eat Babe. The animal gaze, we are reminded,
can also capture and evaluate us.
The criminalised, women, animals - all these are bearers of a denied or
lessened form of subjecthood, which cannot itself command the position
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of knower but which is the object of an arrogant form of knowledge
which so stereotypes and denies their difference and their speech that
they are obliterated as possible subjects of reciprocal exchange or
dialogical encounter. As Foucault notes, to be always under such an
arrogating observation is also the fate of the prisoner, and as feminists
have pointed out, a feminised subjectivity is one in which the subject
internalises such a male gaze. John Berger10 has claimed that this
arrogating conception of the other has now gone so far for animals that
the animal proper is now irrecoverable for us as a possible other for
encounter and communicative exchange. He writes: 'animals are always
the observed. The fact that they can observe us has lost all significance.
They are the objects of our ever-extending knowledge. What we know
about them is an index of our power, and thus an index of what separates
us from them. The more we know, the further away they are'.11 This
diagnosis is acute but perhaps too fatalistic. There are cultural means to
problematise and subvert these anthrocentric conceptions of the animal,
to recover the animal as subject and reciprocal observer rather than as
background, passively observed object; it is encouraging then that in the
final shot of Babe, it is the animal who looks back.
5: Meat and the Colonising Contract
Among the film's other pleasures are the way the lead character Babe,
from his position as speaking meat, systematically disrupts each of the
background assumptions of meat I identified in Part 1. In the initial
scenes of the film, we have (briefly) to confront the first assumption of
the multiple and emphatic denials of kinship presupposed by the factory
farm, and the second as we are introduced to the meat as a speaking
subject. The third assumption, that of a neat, rational and unproblematic
hierarchy of considerability based on intellectual ranking, is
systematically disrupted by Babe and several other characters throughout
the film, and this is one of its best subversive achievements. Thus Babe's
assertion of intelligence and communicative status disrupts Fly's
comfortable assurances to her puppies that 'only stupid animals' are
eaten. This disruption poses ethical and political questions, analogous
to questions arising in post-colonial theory about the role of colonial
hierarchies, about the distinction between meat and non-meat animals,
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and about the nature of the human contract with that special, more
privileged group of animals who can never be 'meat'.
'Babe' is the name of an innocent, an original, Christlike pure soul, to
whom the first news of the dirty secret of meat is eventually revealed in
the outhouse by the revolutionary duck Ferdie - where the meat comes
from, where Babe ('babies') himself comes from, in an act of
disillusionment which neatly parallels that of the human child newly
discovering reproductive and sexual relationships. ('Not the Boss!'
breathes the incredulous Babe, in parallel with the child's shocked 'Not
my parents!') But it is from the malevolent cat that Babe finally learns
the full hurt of the dreadful secret the factory farm and the sinister farm
meathouse hold. The unspeakable is finally spoken: pigs are meat, pigs
are subjects, and pigs suffer the reductive violence which denies,
distances from and hides their subjectivity. Babe is only called 'pig'
while he is alive, but 'they use a different word, "pork or bacon", after
you are dead', explains the satisfied cat, revelling in her privileged,
protected status. As Babe's innocence is stripped away bit by bit, we see
the gradual unveiling of various levels and kinds of animal oppressions
and colonisations - the baring of the 'world of wounds' we all somehow
learn to come to terms with as part of our loss of innocence and 'adult'
accomodation to an oppressive world.
Positioned as counter to these unveilings of oppression are various
emancipatory comments and viewpoints from the animals who appear as
sceptical and critical spectators of the human show. Their comments
deftly expose the politics of the mixed community, especially its human
violence and surrogate dog violence, and the strangeness of human ways.
They give us positive perspectives on the importance of listening to and
being open to others, and on the injustice, distortion and violence of the
exclusionary boundaries which keep Babe positioned as meat. We feel
the thrill of broken chains, the excitement of emancipation as Babe is
gradually enabled to break the boundaries which keep him positioned as
meat, finally crossing the privileged threshold of the house from which
he has been so pointedly excluded to watch television with the farmer
and Babe's surrogate dog mother Fly.
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What I found particularly illuminating here was the exposure of the
levels of hierarchy among animals created by human colonisation in the
small human empire of the farm, an empire which makes concrete human
desire and human will in its social relations and its rational design of the
earth and of the animals themselves. The film displays the key role of
these boundaries of exclusion and levels of hierarchy among animals in
maintaining the practices of meat and the non-subject status of the meat
animal. The dogs, in the canine equivalent of human chauvinism,
attribute their privilege with some complacency to their greater
intelligence, but that facile fabrication is disrupted for us nicely by
Babe's pig intelligence in some of the film's earliest scenes. What is
exposed as unstable, duplicitous and oppressive here is the conventional
boundary and contract on which the relatively privileged status of the pet
and 'house' animal is based, which bears on the privileged status of dogs
and cats in Western society.
Because it reveals the conventionality and instability of the
considerability hierarchy among animals, the film provides us with the
materials to reconstruct the Contract or political origin story for the
privileged group of 'pets' or personal companion animals. In early times,
hunting, farming and shepherding man ('the Boss') in certain societies
made a contract with certain wolves: the contract was that they would be
given a respected role and position very different from that of other
animals, that they would never be meat, in return for help with a critical
task. That task was their active help in the oppression and imprisonment
of other animals, whom they would, using their more-than-human
sensory or physical skills, help confine and construct as meat. In return
for their help in constructing other animals as meat, not only would they
themselves never be meat, they would be 'looked after', given a share of
the meat themselves. Their subjectivity would be recognised, and the
reductive Cartesian conception would never apply to them. The working
animal might often be a 'familiar', like the sheepdogs in Babe, the subject
of a deeply personal relationship, but also accorded the dignity of a coworker and acknowledged for their skilful contribution to economic life.
In the same sense that various human mythic Contracts or founding
political stories are about dividing the spoils, this was a Contract not
only about cooperation in economic life but about mutual benefit in
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meat. But as the disruptions of Babe neatly demonstrate, inclusion in the
contract class has nothing to do with 'intelligence', and everything to do
with complicity.
This Old Contract, originally a cooperative work contract according
privilege in return for complicity in the practice of meat and the
domination or elimination of the non-contract animals, is later under the
Modern Contract extended to the privileged companion animals - the
pets - with whom so many of us continue to share our lives, but extended
in a new form. As production moves out of the household at the
beginning of the modern era, the role of farm-household animals is
transformed in the new separation of public/private in much the same
way as the role of women. Both the working farm wife and the working
farm animal now become subject to the modernist polarity that construes
'rational' economic relationships in alienated, masculinist and narrowly
instrumental terms as hyperseparated from moral and affective familiar
relationships, and affective relationships as occurring in a highly
circumscribed 'private' sphere of altruism supposedly untainted by
economic considerations. The 'familiar' working animal of the contract
class is replaced by the bourgeois 'pet' who, like the bourgeois wife,
leads a sheltered life in a protected private household.12
The hyperseparation between the 'pet' animal and the 'meat' animal is
intensified as the meat animal becomes subject to the rationally
instrumentalised mass-production regime of the factory farm or
laboratory. The 'familiar' animal disappears, and the complementary
polarity of the subjectivised and underemployed 'pet' animal and the
reduced and instrumentalised 'meat' animal takes its place. As Babe
reminds us, the 'familiar' working animal could integrate reason and
emotion, economic and affective, public and private, elements and
exemplify animal skill, difference and mystery.13 In the Old Contract
relationship (at its best), 'familiars' were skilful and respected coworkers, whose economic role was based on their difference from the
human and their consequent ability to extend human senses and human
powers; in the Modern Contract relationship (at its worst), the pet is a
servile toy or dependent lacking both autonomy and mystery, often
conceived in humanised terms as a childlike or inferior self, and for such
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structural reasons increasingly marginal to human lives.14 These are of
course the extremes of a possible continuum, but one that in practice
tends to be configured in response to the political forces underlying the
Old and Modern Contracts. If the pet and the meat tend now to
monopolise the roles these forces have left open, what has disappeared is
the possibility of the animal 'familiars' Babe reimagines for us - the same
animals integrated into our economic as into our affective lives, and at
the same time the possibility of a less alienated form of economic life
which integrates not only the real but the symbolic animal in the form of
affective creativity.
For urban dwellers, which is, increasingly, most of us, animals of the
Modern Contract class of pets usually now represent our main contact
with the animal world. This is unfortunate, because the Modern Contract
defines the pet in opposition to the meat animal and reflects and repeats
many of the duplicities, denials and exclusions involved in the
surrounding western institution of meat. The exclusionary form of the
original contract of complicity in meat is retained and intensified in the
Modern Contract with the pet, usually a carnivore whom the owner
continues to feed on the flesh of other 'meat' animals. The malevolent cat
in Babe is seen thus profiting from the death of the Christmas duck
Rosanna; in real life, non-privileged animals assigned to the 'meat' side
of this dualistic hierarchy die to make meat for the pets of people who
think of themselves unproblematically as animal lovers - kangaroos,
dolphins, penguins, anonymous and rare marine animals in yearly
billions are slaughtered at some remove to feed the cats and dogs whose
own deaths as meat would be unthinkable to their owners.
If the 'pet' is defined in terms of the same Modern Contract that defines
the 'meat' animal, we can understand as complementary constructions the
strongly dualistic boundaries of the 'pet' and 'meat' animal; the pet animal
is a communicative and ethical subject, ideally subject to consideration
and fit for human companionship, the meat animal is none of these
things. If the pet and the meat are complementary polarised aspects of
the same contract, it is this tainted and hidden relationship that enables
our simultaneous claim to love some animals and to have a right to
ruthlessly exploit other animals who are not very different, to
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simultaneously admit pet subjectivity and ignore or deny meat-animal
subjectivity. The Old Contract dignified the role of contract animals, but
presupposed an instrumental relationship to other animals, and this
division becomes a pet/meat dualism in the contract of the modern era.
This genealogy does much to explain the extraordinary contradictions
involved in our contemporary treatment of animals and our claims to
love and respect animals. For example, it is these dualistic contracts that
'animal lovers' honour when they, perhaps even sometimes as vegetarians
or vegans themselves, bring into existence and even breed carnivorous
pet animals whom they feed on the 'meat' of other animals; or whom pet
lovers irresponsibly introduce to inappropriate environments where they
are permitted to make other animals meat and to disrupt carefully
balanced and negotiated communities of free-living animals. The
dualism of the Modern Contract forms the background to such abuses as
the dumping of domestic cats in the wild by 'animal lovers', to become a
menace to indigenous animals in contexts like Australia where there are
few checks and balances.
The moral dualism of both the Old and the Modern Contract helps
construct the taboo against recognising the subjectivity of the meat
animal, as well as the general failure to recognise animal subjectivity,
and produces the moral evasions of meat, especially factory-farmed meat.
Most modern urban dwellers have had some positive experiences with
animals such as dogs or cats, have at some time allowed themselves to
experience them as narrative and communicative subjects rather than as
Cartesian 'machine-animals' or as mindless bodies. But the ethical
dualism and impermeability of this contract boundary prevents them
transferring this awareness to other animals considered 'meat animals' or
to wild animals, reflected in the contradiction of the animal lover's horror
taboo against eating dogs and contrasting indifference or complacency
about the horrific treatment of the 'meat animal'. The recognition drama
of Babe takes us some distance then towards pushing over this key
barrier to a better consciousness of the moral and ecological status of all
animals, showing us how Babe is excluded from contract status as meat,
and how both Babe and the sheep are oppressed by the contract and by
the privilege of the dogs and cats.

34

But in another crucial way the film fails to resolve some key ambiguities
surrounding the contract. For we can also read Babe's liberation in the
end of the film as his joining or displacing the dogs in the contract,
recasting him in the role of non-violent communicator with the rest of
the farm animals. Is Babe's liberation then to be set within the Old
Contract's complicity in the oppression of non-contract animals, and the
Modern Contract's dualism of the meat and the pet? Is it merely the
correction of a mistaken individual placement in the hierarchical species
order of rational meritocracy the contracts preserve? Or does it open up a
new possibility: that Babe's liberation can somehow be extended to all
other animals? To the extent that it is an exclusionary contract, in which
some make a living by complicity in instrumentalising, imprisoning and
oppressing others, the contract cannot be extended to provide liberation
for all. The attempt to use such a contract as a basis for liberation only
succeeds in re-erecting the barrier of moral dualism in a new place,
slightly extending the class of persons while leaving the person/property
dualism unquestioned.
Here we come up against the limits imposed by the liberal understanding
of liberation as individual salvation and by its occlusion of its key
underlying dualistic constructions, which applied to the animal sphere
generates the same problems that various human liberation movements
encounter with liberalism. If Babe is to be saved within the limits of
privilege the contracts define, or because he is included in the category
of persons in recognition of his newly-discovered resemblance to the
human and discontinuity from other animals, we can recognise this as the
same colonising contract some forms of liberal feminism have endorsed,
to allow the other to survive at the price of bringing them under the sign
of the Same and to elevate a few through complicity in the oppression of
others. Feminists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, for example, argued
that women should be admitted to the privileged class of political
rightholders in virtue of their discontinuity with allegedly 'lower groups'
such as negro slaves, and their similarity to the master group, elite white
men. The strategy of extending the category of persons without recasting
the person/property dualism in which it is constructed is bound to fail as
an attempt to elevate animals, for exactly the same reasons that similar
liberal feminist strategies were/are bound to fail. The door opens to admit
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a few, but closes to keep the rest outside where they were. One boundary
of moral dualism is momentarily penetrated, but the rest remain in place
or new ones are constructed. So the film apparently displays Babe's
liberation, but leaves us with the big questions about whether Babe will
be admitted alone, with all other pigs, with some other pigs, with all
other animals, or with everything we might consider food?
An anti-anthrocentric culture would, I think, need to reject the colonising
aspects of the Old Contract Babe shows us, in which 'the Boss'
undertakes to allow familiars the meat of other animals that are treated as
beneath moral consideration. But it would need to reject too the Modern
Contract in which 'pet' and 'meat' animals are defined in dualistic terms
as hyper-separated and complementary animal categories, with the hypersubjectivised and emotionally-invested 'pet' privileged over the
undersubjectivised and emotionally-divested 'meat'. Pet/meat dualism
resembles male/female dualism in its complex relationships and
interconnection with other dualisms; thus pet/meat dualism is closely
associated with and draws on several of the major dualisms that define
the economic life of liberal modernity, such as public/private,
reason/emotion, urban/rural and person/property, and there are strong
resonances with race and gender dualisms for these as well as other
reasons.15 Pet/meat dualism may be seen as a special case of the larger
liberal person/property dualism, in which the pet is treated as a de facto
person, marginally recognised in law, and the meat animal is included in
the larger category of animal economic property.
Feminists have argued that a proper understanding of liberalism requires
an understanding of its gendered dimensions in connecting the
public/private, reason/emotion and male/female dualisms16; it might
equally be said that understanding liberalism requires an understanding
of its animal dimensions, in connecting the human/animal, pet/meat
person/property, public/private, and reason/emotion dualisms. We have
already noticed in part 3 that there is a radical kind of inequality and areciprocity in modern commodity practices of meat that is often not
present in the society of the hunter-gatherer, where carnivorous practices
could express not so much superiority to animals as human inclusion
within a common human-animal realm of reciprocal predation and life-
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exchange. So marked is this that 'meat' can be said to have a different
meaning in each of these political contexts. An important implication for
theory of both these sets of observations is that to understand our
contemporary patterns of relationship with animals we need a more
clearly socially and especially politically nuanced and situated analysis
of these categories than is achievable within the confines of an animal
ethics framework. That is why I have used the term 'animal justice'
instead of the terms 'animal rights' or 'animal defence'.
Moving beyond the contracts17 does not imply that we have to forgo all
systematic association with animals, but rather that we have be prepared
to consider carefully the politics of human/animal relationships and test
them against the criterion of realisation in a society where none are
morally excluded and made available for the horrors of the gulag. But if
the concept of the 'pet' is tainted by the same contract and public/private
duality that defines the 'meat', where do we start? I think that the attempt
to negotiate a new communicative model of relationship with animals
could do worse than start from the concept of the 'familiar' Babe makes
visible again, because the 'familiar' relationship escapes some of the
rigidity of the pet/meat dualism; thus the relationship with the working
animal was often strongly communicative, built on a respect for animal
difference, and unified rather than split the rational-economic and
emotional connection with the animal. Your new familiar could be an
animal with whom you form some kind of communicative bond,
friendship, protective relationship, companion-ship, or acquaintance. The
familiar may, if you are very lucky, be a wild free-living animal in your
local surroundings you see sufficiently often to come to know
individually. Relationships with local lizards, birds, and occasionally
friendly mammals like wombats, are examples. Or they may be a
domesticated or semi-domesticated animal with whom you have
economic as well as affective relations not dependent on the moral
exclusion of other animals. These possibilities start to become available
to us once we begin to see beyond the dualisms that underpin the
contracts.
An attempt to rework the 'familiar' relationship for a new time must
clearly reject the familiar's traditionally oppressive roles in relation to
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other animals. But many of the domestic animals who suffered under the
contracts, hens, ducks and geese for example, thrive as human familiars
and can live with us in ways that enable the formation of communicative
relationships, mutual enjoyment, and exploration - without requiring a
further class of excluded animals who exist instrumentally to provide
them with meat.18 We have to ensure that we take responsibility for any
harm our familiars may do to ecological communities or to communities
of free-living animals, whose welfare I believe should, in the event of
conflict, take priority over our desire for animal companions, and in
many if not most contexts this must mean abandoning the fostering of
dogs and cats. Combining this new/old kind of 'familiar' personal and
moral relationship with animals with an economic relationship, as Babe
imagines, is challenging, to say the least, and involves negotiating so
many difficult tensions that it must ultimately lead towards a major
revisioning and restructuring of economic life. But the potential rewards
are great, and such a strategy also indicates routes towards breaking
down those key contemporary versions of reason/emotion and
public/private dualism that help construct the linked forms of alienation
involved in the human workplace and the animal gulag. To the extent
that Babe helps us reimagine the animal as potential familiar rather than
as pet or as meat, it offers us a glimpse of an overgrown but still
discernible path which could begin our journey towards a non-oppressive
form of the mixed community and a livable future respectfully shared
with animals.
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ETHICS, CONFLICT AND ANIMAL RESEARCH
Andrew Brennan
Introduction
The three Rs of Russell and Burch - Reduce, Replace, Refine - are
widely agreed maxims of animal-based science. The morally-concerned
researcher tries to reduce both the number of animals used in science,
and the impacts of procedures on them. Animals are to be replaced,
wherever possible, by techniques that do not use animals. Techniques
and procedures are to be refined as much as possible to minimise harms.
Implementing these maxims is desirable given that much animal-based
science seeks to promote knowledge through the deliberate and
intentional infliction of harms on other living things, often for the sake of
studying these harms themselves.
When we try to engage in moral discussion about which pieces of
research using animals should or should not be permitted, we run up
against significant problems. In this article, I identify three areas where
doubts are specially acute, and suggest that these can be thought of as the
three Cs of animal experimentation ethics. The three Cs are not maxims,
however. Instead, they indicate areas of difficulty and uncertainty that
have to be negotiated before conclusions can be reached. The three Cs, I
argue, should be taken together with three other dimensions of moral
thinking - details, intuitions and principles. When all these dimensions
are plotted, the result is a space of moral argument and perplexity. By
drawing attention to some features of this space, I am able in the present
article to indicate hidden weaknesses in the present systems for
regulating animal research.
Reason, feeling and ethics
By intuition is meant the sense or feeling we get in a situation that things
are, morally speaking, right or wrong. We often express this sense of
moral rightness or wrongness even when we cannot give a very specific,
reasoned account of why we have the feeling. But ethics is not just a
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matter of feelings. We all recognize the existence of moral rules or
principles, some of which can be rationally justified. Some of the Ten
Commandments of Christianity, or the rule that we should behave
towards others as we would expect them to behave towards us, are rules
that many people would accept as guides for action. When we give
reasons for why an action is right or wrong, we may cite one of these
general guiding principles.
How are the two ingredients, reason and feeling, principles and
intuitions, to be combined? One project of moral theory is to see if a set
of principles can be found which gives a rational justification for our
moral feelings. The general idea of this project is that it should be
possible to put the two ingredients into balance with each other. If a
principle (e.g. ‘Always tell the truth’) leads to behaviour that does not
feel morally right, then the principle has to be modified. Conversely, if
our intuitions are out of keeping with a widely-agreed principle, then we
can try to educate our intuitions so they harmonize with the principle. In
the jargon of theorists, this self-conscious balancing act is an attempt to
find a reflective equilibrium between principles and intuitions.1
For many scientists, the introduction of feelings, or a sense of right and
wrong, into discussions is uncomfortable. With the exception of some
parts of psychology, feelings are not normally the object of scientific
study and the ‘official’ methodology of scientific investigation leaves
little - if any - room for emotions. The scientist is supposed to deal with
theory and evidence in a rational, objective manner, unmoved by
passions. The supposition is seldom confirmed in real life. In discussions
about controversial areas of work, natural scientists become just as
vehement as anyone else. But, despite this, they may at other times try to
dismiss ‘emotive language’, as if matters of right and wrong, duty and
integrity, are not connected with feelings in any way. Modern moral
philosophy shares a part of the scientists’ attitudes here. It does not rule
out the importance of feelings to morality. But it encourages rational, and
impartial, reflection on how feelings can be harmonized with principles.
Moral theory sometimes asks us to step aside from our passionate
commitments, enthusiasms and deeply felt convictions in order to reflect
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on the extent to which they can be brought into conformity with
rationally-justifiable principles.
The quest for reflective equilibrium is not always successful. Even when
a balance is found, this is not the end of moral debate. People who share
the same intuitions and principles can still give different judgments on
the same case. For example, a researcher and an anti-vivisectionist may
share the same moral point of view. One of them, however, believes that
the consciousness and sensation of a certain non-human species is very
close to that of humans. The other does not believe this at all. Let us call
this a disagreement about the details of the case. The term ‘details’ is
used loosely here to cover matters of belief, opinion, probability, theory
and speculation, as well as the known and agreed facts of a situation. In
this sense of the term, many of the sources of argument about animal
research are concerned with the details. Notice that different opinions
about what the details of a case are will often result in different moral
evaluations.
There are thus at least three dimensions to be explored in moral
discussions: details, intuitions and principles. (Buning et al.2 refer to
‘facts’ where I have talked about the ‘details’ of a case). Being aware of
these can be of practical help in resolving disagreements. Often, the
stumbling block is a question of fact, theory or opinion not of values or
ethics. For example, I recall one occasion in which an experimentation
ethics committee was uncertain about approving a project involving the
study of a particular frog species found only in one habitat in Australia.
As part of the research a number of the animals were to be removed from
their environment for laboratory study. After some discussion, it became
clear that the major issues in the minds of those with worries about the
project were two: the relative abundance of the frogs, and the impact of
the investigation on the rest of the habitat. Once these details had been
identified, it became relatively easy to establish parameters under which
the project would be able to qualify for approval.
Not all issues can be settled so smoothly. In particular, there will be
opportunities for endless conflict on matters of detail which are
themselves the subject of different opinions and theories - for example
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the intelligence of birds, or primates, in relation to humans, or the
claimed benefits of research. Principles and intuitions also collide in
fascinating and complex ways. But it would be wrong to think that
contest is the only problem to be encountered in discussions of ethics.
There are three Cs central to ethics - contest, context and complexity.
Each one of these deserves separate description.
Contest
It is apparent that ethical issues are often contested and some of the
problems by which we are most puzzled have no agreed moral answer.
This is obviously true of the debates about euthanasia, abortion or
screening for genetic diseases. It is not just the factual or theoretical
details that are disputed in these cases. Instead there is often a debate
between fundamental ethical orientations or principles. In the case of
research involving animals this contest is widely recognized. Nearly
everyone agrees on some of the factual and theoretical details, for
example, that many of the animals used by researchers have a degree of
consciousness and the capacity for pain and pleasure. When Tom Regan
writes that animals are subjects of a life, many laboratory scientists
would agree. And when Peter Singer points to the existence of animal
suffering we can all think of cases where this has happened.3 So, what is
it that divides Regan and Singer from those who support the continued
use of animals in research?
At present, the argument between supporters and opponents of animal
research seems mainly centred on specific details (matters of fact and
theory). Thereafter, there is a second layer of disagreement about the
ethical stance that is appropriate in the light of the facts. As to details,
there are observations and speculations about the degree of similarity
between human and animal consciousness, sensations and lifestyles. On
the ethical side, there is contest over whether, for example, it is
legitimate to inflict avoidable harms on members of one species in order
to secure a benefit to members of another. To disentangle the factual,
intuitive and principled issues at stake is a large task and lies beyond the
focus of the present article. However, what is said later about levels of
concern draws attention to one of the forgotten areas in this debate.
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Context
Some of the sciences, for example, chemistry and physics, aim to identify
and understand fundamental mechanisms which operate in the same way
in all contexts. The laws in these sciences are global - even universal (in
its literal sense) - in scope. To the extent that they succeed in describing
the universe, they have to be mutually consistent. By contrast, social life
for human beings is not subject to universal unchanging laws. As soon as
we specify a possible principle of conduct, we can think of a context
where it seems not to apply or to be in conflict with some other precept.
For example, suppose we accept the following maxims: first, that we
should be truthful with each other; second, that we should avoid
unnecessary harms to another agent. It is not hard to think of a situation
where telling the truth may do more harm than staying silent. So, the two
precepts come into conflict. So, should we try to live in keeping with just
a single principle? This would be a bad idea for many reasons. In any
case, it does not solve the present problem. Even if we limited ourselves
to the principle of avoiding harm, we encounter conflicts. Consider, for
example, a case where doing harm to one agent prevents a greater harm
to another. It looks as if it might be impossible to live strictly in keeping
with even one principle. For this reason, moral precepts are not to be
regarded as strict and exceptionless. Instead, they always have to be
interpreted according to the specific case we are dealing with and the
context in which we find ourselves.
How does context, the second of the three Cs, affect animal research?
Many laboratory procedures are more or less routine, for example those
involved in antibody production, blood sampling, anaesthesia or
euthanasia. However even in these cases, there are often choices about
where to draw the blood from, or which adjuvant to use to stimulate the
antibody response. Since any of these procedures involve a cost to the
animal, it has to be asked whether there is a real need for this procedure
at all in the context of the overall research program.
Contextual issues associated with these routine activities are regularly
discussed in institutional ethics committees. Not all countries have such
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watchdog bodies, but in Australia, for example, where an animal ethics
committee system is well-established,4 questions about the context of
procedures are standard fare in discussion of whether to approve a
particular proposal. Committees consider in detail whether a given
procedure, taking place in a particular project, is justified in light of the
aims of the project, the potential benefits, and the skills of the
researchers. These are not the only contextual issues. Others may include
how often the procedure is to be used, or the maximum exposure of any
given animal to a particular imposition.
It should be noticed that laying down standard operating procedures does
not preclude a consideration of contextual issues. Any standard protocol
for bleeding, pain relief or anaesthesia has to allow for exceptions. For
example, in Australia, ether is no longer regarded as a generally
appropriate anaesthetic agent for small animals. Experience has shown,
however, that for some applications it remains the anaesthetic of choice
provided it is used with care in a situation where appropriate precautions
are taken. Decisions on when to approve the use of ether are inevitably
context-dependent.
Complexity
The third 'C' is complexity. Actions and decisions are seldom simple: as
the point of view from which we describe something changes we become
aware of this. Lunging at someone with a dagger can at the same time be
assassinating an emperor and starting a revolution.
These three
descriptions of essentially the same physical act draw attention to the
layers of complexity inherent in it. Until we have thought about what we
do from more than one standpoint, we can easily convince ourselves that
our actions are simpler than they are. Consider a case where a tiny pump
has to be installed under the skin of a rat.To suture the wound tightly can
ensure that the pump does not become dislodged. But it can also cause
extra post-operative discomfort; by focusing only on getting the sutures
tight enough the researchers may overlook the other aspects of what they
are doing. When they recognize that getting the sutures tight may not be
getting them right then they have started to think about the other aspects
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of what they are doing outside the province of science and the aims of
the research they are engaged in.
Complexity refers to the capacity for a situation to be multi-layered.
From one point of view, implanting the pump securely is central to
getting the science done. A different layer of considerations is concerned
with the welfare and comfort of the animals. Focusing on one layer to the
exclusion of others is fundamental to many conflict situations. Members
of ethics committee who have a background in animal care and advocacy
will - from the point of view of researchers - sometimes seem to ignore
the significance and excitement of the science. From an outsider’s point
of view, the scientists can seem peculiarly indifferent to the pain or
discomfort of their animals, since their focus is on the demands of the
research and the interest of the results they are achieving. The layer on
which we focus in discussing a case often reflects our own interests. To
grasp the situation in its complexity will often require us to pay attention
to levels and layers that have not previously come to our attention.
Problems of levels and layers are not the same as those of context. We
can see this by focusing on just one context, say the housing
requirements for a specific group of experimental animals. Here there
will typically be different attitudes taken by investigators and animal care
staff. The researchers will normally concentrate largely on the health
status of the animals, ease of access, freedom from infection during any
healing process that is to occur and other matters that are central to the
smooth operation of their research. By contrast, care staff will often be
more aware of lighting levels, environmental enrichment, the suitability
of bedding materials and requirements for play and companionship. So
there are at least these two layers of complexity in such a case.
The two perspectives are often complementary. Adopting both provides
us with a richer understanding of the situation of the animals, care staff
and investigators. Sometimes, however, the demands of one perspective
will be in conflict with the demands of another. Loose bedding, for
example, may be desirable for the species in question, but interfere with
the results being studied. A case like this may sometimes pose a priority
question: which perspective is to be given authority? In a real situation,
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the complexity of the issue would not normally be exhausted by
considering only two perspectives. Other layers to be remembered would
include the nature of the proposed research, its position in a larger
intellectual framework, the career interests of investigators and care staff,
and so on. Philosophers sometimes distinguish ‘thick’ from ‘thin’
understandings of people and situations. Focusing on just one layer or
one dimension of a situation gives us a thin account of it. Recognizing
the existence of complexity is to recognize that any research situation is a
‘thick’ one in this sense.
The problems of ethics
Once the three Cs are recognized, it is easy to see that they will interact
with details, intuitions and principles to define an area of ethical
bewilderment and fascination.
For example, we may encounter
disagreement not only about the appropriate anaesthetic to use in a
particular procedure (a contextual issue) but also about the relevance of
the procedure to testing the hypothesis under consideration (which arises
from thinking about another dimension of a complex situation).
Likewise, two people may agree in principle that a certain procedure is
ethically acceptable; they may still disagree over the issue of whether it
is right to use the procedure in a teaching demonstration as well as in a
piece of research. This latter, contextual disagreement will be a further
difference of principle.
As already emphasized there are no exceptionless moral principles. In
this way, ethics is more like toxicology than chemistry. But it lacks even
the regularities found in toxicology. Moral precepts are general guides to
action. But the most difficult moral problems come up either in
particular situations or in specific classes of case (e.g., abortion,
euthanasia, genetic screening, antibody production). As we add detail to
the cases under review, we develop two things simultaneously. First,
context becomes more clear, and the various dimensions of complexity in
the situation start to be revealed. But, second, this often opens the way
to further conflict involving facts, intuitions and principles.
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Luckily, there are many situations in which the right course of action is
clear, and the addition of further details makes no difference to the
verdict. So there are many occasions where, for example, we recognize
that it is right to do some harm to achieve some good (for example,
pushing someone out of the path of a life-threatening danger). But the
scientific use of animals is an excellent exemplar of how agreement on
principles does not systematically translate to agreement on cases.
Same question - different aspects
As we uncover a situation in more detail, the scope for ethical
disagreement can increase. In this section I want to draw attention to two
different ways we can think about one general issue: the scale of animalbased research. In a previous paper5 I used existing sources in the
literature together with estimates supplied by Mark Matfield and Andrew
Rowan to arrive at the following estimate of scientific uses of animals:
United States
European Union
Canada
Switzerland
Australia
Japan
Rest of the world

22 million (1986)
11.8 million (1991)
2.1 million (1993)
0.86 million (1992)
0.75 million (1989)
2.5 million
10 million (estimate)

This gives a total world animal use in research for the early 1990s of
around 50 million - or, allowing for discrepancies and underestimates in
returns, perhaps 55 to 60 million. Notice that some writers would argue
that a more accurate estimate would be double this figure. If we related
these numbers to populations, we find significant variations among
countries. For example, in most of the industrial world, animals used in
research per million population varies between an upper value of around
120,000 (the United States) and a lower value of around 14,000 (Spain).5
Again, within countries there are divergences in the distribution of
animal use among commercial, government and university laboratories.
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A noteworthy fact is that in nearly all countries for which there exists
reasonable data, it appears that animal use in science has declined very
significantly since 1970, when - again on conservative estimates - total
world usage was probably around 110 - 120 million. Let us assume that
the fewer animals used in research the better. It follows that the situation
by 1990 seems to be much better than the situation in 1970. But this is
only one aspect of the question we started with: the scale of animal use in
science.
To see this issue from a different perspective, consider the following data
drawn from Nicoll and Russell.6 This time, we are considering all forms
of animal use in the United States:
Numbers of Animals Used Annually in the United States
Percentage of total
Food
Hunting
Killed in animal shelters
Fur industry
All teaching and research

6 086 000 000
165 000 000
27 000 000
11 000 000
20 000 000

96.5%
2.6%
.4%
.2%
.3%

The US Department of Agriculture figures show that Nicoll and Russell
appear to have taken no account of animal slaughter for food apart from
chickens.7
The figures in other categories are no more reliable than those in the first
row. The figure for teaching and research is likely an underestimate, and
the deaths in shelters have been extrapolated from a very small and
untypical data set and so are entirely unreliable.
Despite these
drawbacks, the figures can be the basis of some generalization.
Extrapolation would suggest that in global terms the scientific use of
animals represents no more than .25% of total animal killing by human
beings. In fact, if we take into account further impacts such as fishing,
land clearance and so on then .25% will grossly overestimate the
contribution of teaching and research to animal suffering and death.
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These new figures provide a different view on the original question: the
scale of animal research. Animals used in research count for a minute
fraction of human impacts on animals. Their total elimination from
science would have virtually no effect at all on human-induced suffering
and death in the animal world. The fact that such animal use has declined
by 50% over the last twenty five years would now - for some people hardly seem significant at all. Looking at the data from this new point of
view, the same people might ask why research involving animals is so
heavily-regulated and widely-debated. Others (including myself) may
claim that the allocation of significant resources in this area reveals that
animal use in the sciences poses ethical questions of a different sort from
those posed by other impacts on animal lives. I have written on this
matter in other papers, and will not follow it further here.
What I have tried to show in the present section is that considering the
numbers of animals used in research is not a simple matter. Rather, there
are layers of complexity associated with this question. Depending on
how we locate the issue of numbers, we may be tempted to adopt
different perspectives, which themselves can give rise to new questions
of detail, intuition and principle. An animal protectionist may emphasise
the enormous scale of a world industry dedicated to harming animals for
the sake of some dubious human benefits. An animal scientist may
respond by indicating how tiny the proportion of animals harmed in
research is: more than 250 battery chickens are killed for every animal
which dies in the cause of science. Each side has a truth of sorts on its
side. But, until each takes note of the perspective of the other, their
engagement with the situation remains, at best, partial.
.
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Levels of concern
The complexity of life is such that we can often become so engrossed in
thinking about only one aspect of a situation that we miss other aspects
of it. There are many other ways to think about the scale of animal
research apart from the two given in the previous section. And there are
many different ways to think about specific pieces of research as well.
In this section, I develop the idea of complexity further in order to draw
attention to a hidden area in the animals debate. Once this is brought to
light, it becomes obvious that present methods of regulating animal
research are inadequate. It follows from what I argue that there is no
place in which certain issues of fundamental importance can be debated.
The only people with an influence on these matters are the animal-using
scientists themselves. To a certain extent, then, scientific animal use is
running free from social control and proper ethical scrutiny.
To identify the hidden area, let us put ourselves in the place of a
researcher. Suppose I am committed to a worthwhile research program
carried out to the highest standards. One day, I start to think about the
large number of other programs which failed to get funding at the time
my own one was funded. I follow this up by considering whether the
proportion of the research dollar going to the sort of work I am engaged
in is being well spent in comparison to how it might have been spent (say
in epidemiological or public health research, or in preventive medicine
programs). I have a nagging doubt that something is wrong: might it not
be better if the money being spent on my research were going to some
other program?
Notice where this chain of thought goes. It does not move immediately to
the conclusion that there might be anything inherently wrong in what I
am doing. In terms of the standards in my area, the research I undertake
is of high merit, let us suppose. The ethics committee in my institution
actually regards me as a model scientist, and I have pioneered some
novel forms of environmental enrichment for the animals I work with. So
there are no ethical problems about laboratory practice, the integrity of
the research team, the standards of animal care, and so on. Notice that it
was not from this point of view that my concerns arose. They involved
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larger questions about how society is using its resources, and the
direction that scientific research is taking. Suddenly, I reflect that this
situation is no different from many others in which people find
themselves. For instance, a police officer who would like to see certain
drugs decriminalized may still work effectively and ethically as a
member of a drug team enforcing the very laws that she would prefer to
see changed. This looks like a similar case. The officer does everything
right, even when there is a question hanging over whether the laws the
officer is enforcing are themselves right. The very same behaviour which
is right, from one perspective, is also seen as wrong from a different one.
The thought experiment has illuminated an important possibility. It may
not be right that certain research is taking place, even when the
researcher carrying it out is doing everything right! Any air of paradox
about this evaporates once we see that actions are complex and can be
viewed from more than one perspective. The second kind of rightness is
concerned with the behaviour of the researcher, and the quality of the
research. This is the sort of rightness which is monitored and policed in
Australia by the animal ethics committees within institutions. These
committees have to include members of animal protection and advocacy
groups (as required by the national Code of Practice). As a consequence,
approval of research projects and housing standards is subject to
particularly tough scrutiny by people who may be in principle opposed to
all research on live animals. However, these people have no input to
deciding on the first kind of rightness. More accurately, they do not have
input to this through their membership of institutional ethics committees.
How can we start to think about the ethics of animal use away from the
institutional perspective? Any of a hundred examples would do, and I
consider, for vividness, just one. For some parts of diabetes research, a
widely-used animal model is the streptozotocin rat. Rats injected with
streptozotocin suffer damage to the pancreas which induces diabetes. At
different research centres, these damaged animals are studied for the light
they can shed on glycogen synthesis or other biochemical phenomena
which may advance the understanding and management of diabetes in
humans.
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At the institutional level, ethics committees have to be aware of the
special problems associated with streptozotocin (it is an unstable and
dangerous substance), the special care needs of the affected animals and
the need for research involving such high impositions on the animals to
be of the best quality as judged by international standards. It is at this
level of concern that the input from animal advocacy groups is mandated
in Australia and some other countries. Where there is doubt about a
specific research proposal, committees may rely on external referees to
assure them of the competence of the investigator and the significance of
the work. What is important to recognize, however, is that these
institutional-level concerns do not give a complete answer to the
question: ‘Is it right to undertake this piece of research?’
Here are some questions which cannot be adequately addressed as long
as the focus is on the institutional setting:
(1)
How successful has this general line of research been in
illuminating mechanisms, or stimulating new approaches to treatment
and management of human diabetes?
This question is, at best, only partially addressed at institutional level,
and has by and large to be left to the judgment of the scientific
community and funding bodies. The peer-review mechanism of national
grant-awarding bodies does not normally provide for lay input or for any
form of independent ethical scrutiny.
(2)
To what extent are animal-based studies proving currently
productive for the general understanding of the relevant human
biochemistry?
This can be answered, if at all, only by considering the field of
biochemistry as a whole at a given time. National strategy committees, or
review sessions at international conferences, would be appropriate places
for an explicit discussion of this topic. These normally have no animal
protectionist input, or independent ethical scrutiny. If national or
international review impinges on discussion at institutional level it will
only be via the expert judgment of researchers and referees. At
institutional levels, it has to be taken on trust that programs which
qualify for competitive funding will be productive given the current
directions in biochemical research. In summary, it seems that only
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scientists themselves will ever give consideration to, and attempt answers
for, this question.
(3)
What is the appropriate weight to be given to research on diabetes
(including the rat model) compared with research on other human health
problems?
This third query is of the same kind that was put by the investigator in
our thought experiment given above. It is only one of indefinitely many
comparative questions which raise matters that can only be understood in
relation to national and international trends, funding practices, and social
analysis. Unlike the second question, this one cannot easily be fitted in to
discussion at specialist scientific conferences. Like the second one, if
addressed at all, it is likely to be considered by expert groups without the
input of lay persons and animal protection advocates.
Conclusion: Arenas of conflict
The previous section raises questions of context and complexity that are
seldom addressed explicitly in the literature on animal research.
Philosophers, obsessed with principles and ethical theories, often gloss
over the details of how moral decisions are reached. It is much easier to
say that a practice is wrong than to suggest ways in which it can be made
better. At the most general theoretical levels, there is a tendency to think
in terms of exclusive positions: complete abolitionism at one side, and
freedom for science on the other. Debates between such extremes are
generally sterile, however inspirational their ideals. Institutions, caught
in the middle, have set up committees and adopted national standards in
an attempt to find a way forward that respects some of the demands of
science on the one hand and the case for animals on the other. What I
have argued above is that this is not enough. The ethical scrutiny of
scientific animal use inevitably raises questions that cannot be settled
within the institutional context.
In his address to the 10th annual Summit for the Animals on April 7,
1995, in St. Louis, United States, Merritt Clifton (editor of Animal
People) urged the animal protection groups to become a ‘loyal
opposition’ to science. In a parliamentary democracy the loyal opposition
strenuously opposes the government of the day while sharing with it
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respect for national laws, principles of democracy and due process.
Australia is fortunate that it already has a loyal opposition, many of
whose members sit on animal ethics committees. For them, however, the
experience can be frustrating. Several of the high-level considerations
that may have informed their resistance to animal research can find no
expression at the institutional committee. When a proposal for research
into a disease which affects only a small proportion of the population is
put forward, there is no space for saying that the money would be better
spent on tackling the health problems of Aboriginal communities. This is
not an issue for a scientific establishment, like a university, to decide.
Indeed, the funds for which the researcher is applying may well not be
available for any other purpose. It follows that only some of the rights
and wrongs of various pieces of research can be debated at the
institutional level.
The establishment of animal ethics committees may give the misleading
impression that the only arena of conflict over animals in research is the
institutional one. It is not, and there is no reason for excluding the loyal
opposition, and the rest of society, from playing its part in the ethical
evaluation of science at levels beyond the university and the research
laboratory. Most scientists recognize that science is not something above
the law, and that they have no special authority when it comes to
assessing the ethical implications of their work. It is surprising, then, that
so little attention has been given to establishing national committees of
ethical review, with a broad mandate and a wide membership. Such
committees would become part of larger structures of scrutiny which
would provide some assurance that science and technology is not
running out of control.
For the purposes of this brief article, I have ignored the standard political
processes in which animal protection organisations, the media and
scientific pressure groups already play a part in dealing with contested
issues. The possibilities for political activity, however, are not limited to
elections, demonstrations, journalism and lobbying. Given that
controversy can arise at many levels, the decision to include members of
the ‘loyal opposition’ in decision-taking at institutional level in no way
precludes them from having an important role to play at other levels.
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Being aware that such levels of concern exist is also an incentive for
establishing structures which can permit societies to explore more of the
complexity of the problems which worry us.
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TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO GENE TECHNOLOGY IN
ANIMALS
Birgitta Forsman
Gene technology on animals has increased enormously in Sweden during
the 1990s. Most of it has to do with transgenic laboratory animals.
Before this increase began, there was an official investigation of
potential ethical problems of animal biotechnology, in which it was said:
‘We have the possibility to set the limits "from the beginning".’ And it
also tried to do it.
This investigation was set up in 1989, when the Swedish government
appointed a Principal Administrative Officer of the Ministry of
Agriculture to make a so-called one-man investigation about gene
technology used on animals and plants. A white paper from this
investigation was published in February 1990 with the title Genteknik –
växter och djur (Gene technology–plants and animals).1 In the following,
this white paper is called ‘the first report’.
However, in March 1990, the same government decided to set up a new
investigation, which was called ‘The Commission on Gene Technology’.
This was a big, so-called parliamentary commission with several
politicians and experts in it and led by a retired Vice-Chancellor of a
prestigious university in Sweden. This commission publicized its white
paper in September 1992 with the title Genteknik – en utmaning (Gene
technology–a challenge).2 In the following, this white paper is called
‘the second report’.
The first investigation was commissioned by the Minister of Agriculture
and the second by the Minister of Justice. It is unclear whether there had
been any contact between the ministers about the issue. The existence of
the first report is briefly mentioned in the second, but there are no real
comments on it.
The Commission had a wider objective than the one-man investigation.
However, the Commission decided in an early stage not to deal with gene
technology on human beings, with the motivation that this subject had
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already been treated by an earlier investigation that had published a
white paper in 1984. The fact that a white paper on gene technology on
animals and plants had been published much later, namely ‘the first
report’, did not prevent the Commission from dealing with the report.
Whether this is a deliberate shift of policy from the government is
unclear. One could easily interpret the creating of the Commission as a
rejection of the first report, but knowing about the long procedures
before a Commission is set up I would hardly thing that this is a probable
explanation. Rather, the cause seems to have been ignorance about the
investigation that was already done. Also, the Principal Administrative
Officer who made the first investigation was appointed as one of the
experts on the Commission.
The first report stated several restriction, while the second report was
rather liberal towards the use of gene technology. Some examples of
considerations and suggestions in the first report are these:
– Gene technology used on animals is discussed mainly from an ethical
point of view. In contrast, gene technology used on plants and micro
organisms is discussed from the perspective of potential risks. The
reason for this distinction of perspectives is that animals have moral
standing, while plants and micro organisms with these things. have not.
– Generally, it is said that a Swedish prohibition or moratorium for
research in gene technology would be both unwise and unrealistic. It
would affect Sweden very negatively.
– Animal experiments are examined by ethics committees in Sweden.
The first report points out that the considerations of these committees are
limited to aspects concerning the treatment of the animals and the
question whether the experiment has to be performed on animals. The
ethics committees do not pay any attention to possible consequences of
the research, for example if the gene technology research will result in
products that are not desirable for ethical reasons. The first report says
that research with gene technology on animals should be reported and
examined from an ‘extended ethical point of view’. This should be done
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by a suggested Gene Technology Advisory Board. According to the
report:
– Research with gene technology on food-producing animals with the
goal of increasing the growth or production shall always be disapproved.
– Research with gene technology on food-producing animals or pets
shall always be disapproved if a gene from a different species, including
human beings, is brought into the animal.
– When animals modified with gene technology are ready to be let out in
the environment or in production, the advisory ethical decisions will be
insufficient. The existing animal ethics committees decide to approve or
disapprove single applications (or protocols) concerning experiments on
animals. However, this decision is only an advice to the scientist. He
doesn’t have to follow the decision. He can perform an experiment even
if the application has been disapproved What is needed however is a
binding regulation.
The considerations of the second report are more vague and
metaphysical. Two questions occur time and again:
(1) Does nature have an intrinsic value and, if so, in what sense?
(2) Do humans have the right to alter nature and, if so, is there a limit to
this right?
The second report presents a value basis with the following ingredients:
– The existence of an intrinsic value in nature.
– The Reverence for life principle (taken from Albert Schweitzer, of
course).
– The doctrine of environmental protection, which means that one should
‘prevent serious and irreversible disturbances in the fundamental
functions of natural ecosystems’.
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– A Kantian view on nonhuman nature, including animals.
– Animal well-being shall be the main basis for the assessment of gene
technology used on animals.
Some more practical suggestions in the second report were the following:
– It shall be permitted that plants, animals and micro organisms be
altered for ‘important purposes’.
– It shall be permitted that patents on living matter, including animals, be
granted.
– It shall be permitted that all kinds of transgenic animals be constructed.
– It shall be permitted that chimeric animals be constructed for research
purposes.
– No general prohibitions should be included in the law.
Clearly, there is an inconsistency both between the value basis and the
practical suggestions and internally in the value basis itself. The first
report draws a line between animals on one side and nature in general on
the other. In this report, animals are regarded as individuals. In contrast,
the second report is more ‘holistic’ and regards nature as a whole. The
second report does not make any distinction between animals and other
natural objects as potential possessors of moral standing. This confusion
entails that the suggestions of this report are either vague or inconsistent
with some items in the chosen value basis. There are also details in some
statements of the experts in the Commission that simply clash with
suggestions in the first report. One example is when the theological
expert of the Commission says that he can see no ethical problems in
connection with transferring human genes into animals used for food.
One can ask how it can be that two official investigations, set up by the
same Swedish government, within the period of a couple of years could
reach such deviating conclusions. And one can ask why this fact has not
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been regarded and discussed. Why was the first report suddenly
forgotten, as soon as the Commission had been set up? Why did the
different ministers of the government and their staff not communicate
with each other – there are no signs of such a communication?
I have no definite answers to these questions, but there are some possible
explanations: The commitment of the persons involved varied and was
also different in direction. The Minister of Agriculture was the one who
had forced through the bill of the internationally well-known animal
protection law in 1988. The Principal Administrative Officer, who made
the first investigation, was a close staff member who had done much of
the preparatory work for this law.The Ministry of Justice had no
commitment to animal welfare. They probably regarded it necessary to
set up a commission for harmonizing the Swedish law on gene
technology with the European Union, in which Sweden some years later
became a member state.
The first report is not hostile to science, but it draws some limits for the
treatment of animals in the gene technology context. The second report
gives power to the scientific community to form their own practices. The
practical and legal consequences in the Swedish society have been more
in accordance with the second report than with the first one. However,
there were some parliamentary decisions made that from the beginning
upset the scientific community. One of these decisions was the forming
of a new agency for gene technology, which in fact only constituted a
reorganization of an agency that had been existing since 1980. Also, the
lamentations from scientists soon abated.
One cannot say that there is any difference in the treatment of animal
ethics in Sweden as a consequence of the first or the second report.
However, the quantity of experiments with animals modified by gene
technology has increased considerably.3

Notes
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Patsy Hallen interviewing Julia Bell
Patsy Hallen: You have quite an extraordinary life because you live in
the company of animals and I would just like you to describe where you
live and who you live with.
Julia Bell: Thanks Patsy. I live in a little place called Ravensthorpe
which is about two hours drive from Esperence and three hours from
Albany in Western Australia. It is very, very dry and it is an old farming
and mining community. There are about two hundred people in the town.
It's very parochial, very sexist, very racist and very speciesist. I have
lived there for three years with many companions: seven camels, five
dogs, numerous joeys who unfortunately have died in various accidents,
and a very spectacular carpet snake who lives in my bedroom with me. I
have two old galahs who I rehabilitated many years ago. They have been
with me for about fifteen years and I have numerous chickens, geese,
turkeys, three very sweet pet pigs, a goat called Cindy who I milk and a
ram called Minstrel because he is black and white and he still has his tail.
My son, Byron who is 23 now, comes and goes.
Patsy Hallen: It would be interesting for readers to hear why you choose
this companionship and what you learn from these animal people with
whom you live?
Julia Bell: To answer that I will have to give some background of my
life and how I have come to be in Ravensthorpe. I studied philosophy for
many years completing an honours degree in moral philosophy with
Freya Mathews at Murdoch University in Western Australia. Then I took
off up to the Pilbura and spent some time with the Anunga Marda people
in the Great Sandy Desert. I still had a hankering to get back to
philosophy. I joined the bioethics program at Monash University
working with Peter Singer and Justin Oakley. This greatly inspired me as
I had read about Peter Singer for years and wanted to meet him and to
spend time working with him. I completed my course work and came to
Perth to complete my thesis as an external student. I returned to Perth
and worked with my camels while continuing with my thesis. It was on
vulnerability and what it means to be human. It concerned psychological
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vulnerability as well as physical vulnerability. I was fortunate to have
Justin Oakley as my supervisor who encouraged me in this area. When I
came back I realized I couldn't really contemplate the vastness of what
the thesis meant without putting myself in a physical position of doing it.
So I thought that I would start a camel trek. I started walking from
Spencer's Brook and ended up out on the Nullarbor Plain about five
months later. I was walking through very cold weather to start with and
rain and hail and then as the months wore on, I ended up in a very warm
climate, too warm in fact, and I had to come back. I came back to Perth
and felt claustrophobic and I related to a comment on the radio 'I'm
laying on my bed about to turn 40 and I'm going mad'. I was about a
week off turning 40. I suddenly realized what this meant, jumped up,
found the house for sale in Ravensthorpe and approached my neighbour
to buy my property. It literally happened overnight. He bought my
property and I headed off to Ravensthorpe and got my camels back. My
main reason was that I had to get back to space. I had to get back with
my camels after spending five months with them. I guess it did change
my life in very profound ways which I cannot even express at this stage.
I bought an old property in Ravensthorpe which was very dilapidated. In
fact it was a rubbish tip. The thing that inspired me was that there was a
small part of the property which was the only piece of land in
Ravensthorpe that aboriginals had lived on for many years. They had left
fifteen years ago. That is where I built my camel yards, in that very spot.
The property is sixty three acres and for last three years I have tried to
rebuild it making fences, planting trees and making the house decent. As
you can imagine the rainfall here is very low, so to keep things is alive is
difficult. I live there with my companions in a very small house. I have
encouraged the local frog population by creating two ponds. I have a
whole variety of different frogs there now. I have also encouraged the
reptile population which includes tiger snakes. I am trying to work out a
way for us to live comfortably together without having to kill every
second tiger snake I see which has been very difficult.
That was the reason I had to get back to that gold fields country. But
when I arrived there I realized it was probably a foolish thing as there
was no university and I had separated myself from my close circle of
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female friends who I lived with very closely in Perth. To get to university
was a six hour drive. I felt very isolated. I felt very much a minority. I
felt I was fighting for my self preservation and identity because of battles
with shire officials, e.g. to get camel signs on my road, to stop them
using herbicides around my property. It was incredibly tough but I
managed to do it.
From there I started thinking how could I constructively create a
philosophical life using my background and living with animals as I had
chosen to live and working with the earth. I created a very viable
vegetable garden which I basically live out of. I have tried killing my
chickens for meat with no success. I really found it difficult wringing the
chickens necks or chopping their heads off, so I stopped that. What I am
trying to do now is to set up some ecological niche whereby I can live
with the introduced animals which I have for educational purposes. I
have children coming out from the schools and families bring their
children. What I am trying to do in a very basic way is talk to the
children, read them a narrative such as 'Charlotte's Web' and express to
them very simply the ideas of intrinsic and instrumental value. I use that
philosophical narrative in a simple way hopefully to show the children
that there are other ways of looking at sheep and pigs than purely as a
resource for either meat or whatever. That seems to have been quite
successful.
The other thing which I am aiming at is to get a sanctuary going for the
wildlife endemic to the area. I have had no success with all the avenues
I've tapped into: conservation-wise, government departments and
departments which are meant to be helping women in rural communities.
I've just come up against a brick wall and the story that I've been told
runs: you can set it all up, but there is no funding. So to keep the place
sustained I've had to go back nursing part-time. The other thing I thought
of doing is running philosophy groups for children, which I have done
elsewhere. I have approached the local schools but the principals are not
familiar with philosophy and they tell me that there is no funding even
though I've offered my services on a voluntary basis. I hope this answers
why I am here.
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Patsy Hallen: So Julia, it was really camels that galvanized you back
into a rural setting because you couldn't keep your camels where you
were living in Perth. Can you tell us something about sharing your life
with camels? What are camels like and what do you like about them?
Julia Bell: Camels are really quite remarkable creatures. They deserve a
lot of respect. They are incredibly intelligent, very, very resourceful and
very functional. When I was on my trek I used to think about Aristotelian
ethics. Aristotle as well as the modern commentator Martha Nussbaum
talk about what it means to be human, the primary thing is being
functional and I think about the connection with this and how the camel
of all animals is such a functional animal in so far as it is incredible in
any situation. It adapts so amazingly to the heat and to the cold. It can
recycle its urine. It is the only mammal with oval blood corpuscles. Other
mammals have round ones and this is the reason that it doesn't hydrate
like other mammals. So there are all these wonderful functions which it
has. It can slow down its whole metabolism. It can go up to three weeks
with no water and it can go up to two months with very little food. So the
connection between philosophy and camels is very clear to me using an
Aristotelian framework. Sometimes I find that difficult to explain,
especially talking to other cameleers. Talking to other philosophers I feel
quite comfortable. So for those reasons and I also think they are very
sensual sorts of animals. I love stroking them and spending time with
them. I've attended the three female camels (cows) births and I have been
very close right through the deliveries. I've trained all my camels myself
which has taken a lot because I've been kicked and had my eyes slashed,
and been bitten and spat on. They are very big animals as you can
imagine. I've never hit them with polypipe which is very common
amongst cameleers. The majority of male cameleers laugh and say you
have got to give the animal a good hiding. I always reflect when they talk
about camels in this way about the close connection with the feminine:
'You have got to break her in. You have got to hobble her'. I'm always
making these connections with my life with camels.
Patsy Hallen: Yes. So the distinction which you are using is that you
refuse to break your camels in. You really want to encourage them to
follow you. So you want to train them rather than to break them.
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Julia Bell: Yes. I actually talk about working with my camels, with all
of my animals, rather than breaking them in. You can never break a
camel in.
Patsy Hallen: Julia, Camels are feral but they are much less harmful on
the natural world because they don't have hard hoofs. Would that be
right? Compare them say to horses. How are camels in relation to horses?
Julia Bell: Camels are very low maintenance compared to a horse. You
don't have to shoe them. They have very soft pads so they don't take
dieback into areas which are prone to dieback. Compared to a horse, a
cow or a sheep, they don't just strip anything. They are top graziers. They
are very selective with their eating. So even though they are feral they do
belong to Australia. They are very well adapted to the Australian climate.
Patsy Hallen: So when they take a bush, they just basically prune it.
They don't destroy the bush?
Julia Bell: Yes.
Patsy Hallen: It has been said that Australia has the largest population of
wild camels left in the world and that they are very healthy as well.
Julia Bell: Yes. Australia is the only country left in the world with wild
camels. Every other camel that you see is basically owned. The reason
why Australian camels are in such high demand in the Middle East is that
they are very low in diseases. They only thing that the camel has in
Australia is mange or worms which are easily controlled. They are very
healthy and very good stock.
Patsy Hallen: I've also heard you say that they are very resourceful in so
far as they combine being a sheep, a cow and a horse. Do you want to
explain that?
Julia Bell: What I mean by that is they have this amazing hair. It's not
wool like a sheep. It has no lanolin and you can take the hair off in big
sheets. You can skin it and make wonderful garments. You have
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probably seen the '40's and '50's expensive camel hair coats. The other
thing is that you don't have to shear them like you do a sheep. You don't
have to do all the mulesing and all the horrible business which is really a
necessity in the country with sheep. You get away from that. You can use
their tail. Artists make paint brushes from their tails. It is very fine hair
and you can make butter out of their humps. You can eat their lean meat
which is very low in cholesterol and you can milk them. I was reading an
article in the New Scientist recently said that the milk has properties in it
which enhances the human immune system. Now their little pads are
being exported to Asian countries for use as an aphrodisiac. That is just a
side thing but overall what I mean by comparing them with a horse, a
cow and a sheep is that they are far more functional. You can use the
whole animal, more than any of those other animals, if you choose to but
more than anything they make wonderful companions. They are very
loyal, very faithful and once you make a friend with a camel, it is a bit
like an elephant, they never forget.
Patsy Hallen: Yes. I guess that they are like a sheep in that you can use
their fur or coat. They are like a horse in so far as they are a good pack
animal.
Julia Bell: And you can also tan their leather, like a cow.
Patsy Hallen: Yes. And you can milk them like a cow but that is looking
at them in a very utilitarian way. I suppose that we are talking about
animals that have died naturally and the problem with something like
using their pads as aphrodisiacs for an Asian market is that might then
drive people to kill camels just for their pads rather than looking at
illusions of human potency or rather than addressing the psychosexual
problems of males. We take it out on animals and slaughter animals for
that purpose in the hope that they will give us some kind of potency.
Would you Julia, being as close as you are to your camels, would you eat
a camel?
Julia Bell: I have eaten camel meat but because I am a basically a
vegetarian, I don't like any meat unless it is an absolute necessity. I have
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shot a young goat when I was out on the Nullarbor and I have shot
rabbits basically for survival and for survival, if I was in a desert, I would
shoot a camel. I wouldn't eat one of mine unless I was starving. I would
have to be sensible about it. I think that it is a matter of respect. It is like
what Peter Singer is saying, 'If you can't kill it, you shouldn't eat it'. If
you are going to kill an animal, if you use the whole animal that is better
than just shooting them like a lot of station owners are doing in the desert
at the moment. They claim that the camels are destroying the fences
which is rubbish. There is no evidence to back that up but instead of just
shooting them and leaving them to rot, they should be used
constructively. That is what I am trying to get at, not that I would like to
see that done but if the populations do grow as is happening then I think
that they should be used constructively rather than just shot and left to
rot. It is similar with the kangaroo population - you get the arguments
that some have to be killed. If it has to be done then it should be done
sensitively and in a constructive way.
Patsy Hallen: I always used to think that it was a waste to just shoot
animals and let them rot until someone pointed out to me that the whole
local natural environment might profit from them. Humans don't but all
the worms, the grubs and the things that eat the carcass and the dingoes
may profit.
Julia Bell: Yes. There are always so many ways of looking at it.
Patsy Hallen: I can remember once when I was back-packing and I was
carrying little protein. There was a dolphin washed up on the beach
which was clearly dead. I went over to look at it and give it my respect. I
wondered whether I should eat it. In the end I couldn't bring myself to eat
it even though it was dead. I guess it is a matter of respect. It was a bit
degrading for the dolphin to have some part hacked out of it. I suppose
eventually one of your camels will die of old age. Would you have the
courage to eat it or would you just bury it?
Julia Bell: No. Only if I was starving. To me there is no difference in
saying if my loved one, my child or a close friend dies I would bury out
of respect. But I guess if I was in the middle of the Andes, as in the
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stories of plane crashes, and my loved one died, then to eat a bit of that
meat for my survival is almost sacred. However because I don't have to
do that I wouldn't do it.
Patsy Hallen: We are participating in Earth Philosophies Australia Bush
School and Julia is one of our honoured facilitators. This morning we
met in a beautiful room called The Hexegon, an eight sided room built
mostly of glass and recycled timber which sits under a canopy of very old
kauri trees. It looks over a beautiful inlet called the Wilson Inlet which
has got granite boulders which jut out into its basin and there are lots of
spoon bills, pelicans, coots, ducks and swans. We were sitting there and
Julia told us a very moving story about her lead female camel called
Suzie and the death of Suzie's calf. Could you repeat that story for us
Julia?
Julie Bell: Susie has had two calves now since she has been with me.
She is probably now twenty years old. Camels live up to sixty years.
Camels are likened with the elephant. I have heard scientists discuss
elephants and camels along with whales which is quite inspiring. She is
not really an old cow. This was her second delivery. I had a dream weeks
before that I had given birth to three children and the first one died. So I
thought that something would happen to Suzie's calf. I have a close vet
friend, who is recognized as the camel vet of Western Australia. He lives
about three hours drive from me but on this occasion, I didn't contact
him.
I sat in the paddock with Suzie all day and I camped by her that night in
my sleeping bag. It was a very foolish thing because camels are very
protective of their newborn. There could have been a disaster. She could
have jumped on me and crushed me with a hard bony prominence under
a camel's chest. That is how they can crush you to death. I trusted her.
I've got this amazing sense of trust and I think that there is a sense of
reciprocity. I slept with her through the night and she was bleeding. The
thing that moved me was that I was also menstruating so I thought of this
strong connection with the whole cycle of life and the movement of
things, the passage of things. I was bleeding. She was bleeding. She was
giving birth and the moon was coming up. So it was a very special night
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for me. She delivered and it was a breach birth. When I helped pull the
calf out, she was struggling. I tried to give it mouth to mouth
resuscitation to get it breathing which I did do with Suzie's first calf and I
got that one breathing. I tried with this one but it didn't work. It was
obviously dead. She just let me do it which amazed me. She let me
fondle the calf. Then she turned around and sniffed it, nudged it with her
nose and bellowed. It sounded like that harrowing whale sound. It went
on for three days. I left her in the paddock with the calf and the placenta,
let her smell it, let her realize the calf was dead and do her own grieving.
For me, there was a strong connection between both of us. After three
days I picked the calf up and wheeled it in a wheel barrow a fair way to a
grave yard that I had organised with the hole already dug. She was with
me when I put the calf into the hole and buried the calf.
Patsy Hallen: And to this day you say, although there is good tucker, the
camels won't go near.
Julia Bell: I have probably half an acre which I have set aside. I call it a
sacred cove where I bury all of my companions. I let the camels out to
graze on the blue bush nearby, but they never go near the cove area.
Susie bellowed for three days and for a year after that she wouldn't let me
near her. She had a change of personality. I feel that she blamed me or
thought that I had done something to the calf. It is just recently that we
have re-connected. I have let her go very gently after the last two years.
The interesting thing now is that I have a new camel, Betsy, who is
pregnant and about to deliver any day. Sinbad the bull has given her a
hard time so I have had to separate him as it is not his calf. Even though
he is gelded he is still quite fiery. The strange thing is that Luke, a friend
who is looking after the camels, says that Suzie has become like a
midwife to Betsy. She follows her around. She is out in the paddock
keeping Sinbad away. It is quite a remarkable relationship. She has taken
on the midwife role of watching to make sure that none of the other
camels come and harass her while she is delivering. So they are quite
remarkable animals.
Patsy Hallen: Thank you Julia for being a midwife to our understanding
of how better to live with animals. I think that you are not only a
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philosopher in the traditional sense of the word insofar as you are a lover
of wisdom but I also think you know about the wisdom of loving.
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BOOK REVIEWS
Garber, Marjorie. Dog Love. 341 pp. (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1996)
What does it mean to love a dog?
Marjorie Garber, Director of the Center for Literary and Cultural Studies
at Harvard, and best known for her cultural studies of bisexuality and
cross-dressing, has mobilised her analytical talents and undertaken an
enormous and illuminating project: a literary and popular investigation of
our relationship to and love for dogs.
Dog Love is an overview of our historical, literary and cultural
preoccupation with dogs: from the history of breeding, to criminal and
rescue dogs; psychoanalysis and dogs (including Freud's dogs) to the
new, popular literary anthropomorphism; Dylan Thomas' The Portrait of
the Dog as a Young Artist to television's Lassie; writers' dogs to
academics' dogs (and their dogs' names); talking dogs to bestiality;
petimony (and pooper scoopers) to DNA cloning; a dog's grief to dog
loss. Yet despite its scope (or perhaps because of it), Garber manages to
open up many important philosophical and ethical issues, suggesting a
range of areas for further theoretical analysis.
Having owned my very first dog (Hilda Doolittle, a kelpie named after
the poet) for two years now, this book celebrated my new-found dog
love, while posing questions I had only recently asked myself: What does
it mean that I fantasise about speaking with my dog? (or more truthfully,
fantasise about becoming-dog?) Is a dog an agent in itself or merely an
extension of its human owner in relation to the law? Who is responsible
for the damage a dog may do? What does the increasing jurisdiction
around dogs and the corresponding fight for dog-rights reflect? Do
puppies have mirror-phases, as Lacan suggests human children do? (I am
sure I caught my dog 'stuck' in the mirror once.) Can a dog contemplate;
can she be a philosopher? (One morning when I refused to get up, I let
Hilda outside to wait for me. From my bedroom window I watched her
sitting exceptionally still in the middle of the garden, her nose up, just
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smelling the air - I imagined - and watching/ listening to the birds. She
remained that way for a good twenty minutes.) Why is it easier
sometimes to love my dog than my lover? Do dogs have souls?
While always contemplative, Dog Love is also a collection of real-life
and fictional-life (dog biography and autobiography) accounts of doghuman relationships, and the emotional, psychological, sometimes sexual
and often financial investments we make in them.
It is unbelievable as the dog who arrived to meet his owner at the subway
station every day for nine years after his owner had died, waiting at the
station until midnight, only to return the next day;
funny as Shady Spring Kennels in Maryland which offers: '...dogpaddling, Frisbee and hiking, a Bark-and-Ride camp bus, a camp spa
with hairdo and pedicure, and bunk photographs for the proud parents to
take home'; dog superstores and dog psychiatrists;
disturbing and politically relevant as the tale of the pit-bull from
notoriously racist Virginia who was in need of rescue from legal
'execution' for being a dangerous dog; and his black owner who believed
he could save him by explaining to the court that: 'All the ladies in the
neighborhood like him. Not just the colored ladies. The white ladies too';
and wise as Virginia Woolf's account of a Robert Browning's dog Flush
after a haircut: 'What am I now? he thought, gazing into the glass. And
the glass replied with the brutal sincerity of glasses, "You are nothing."
He was nobody. Certainly he was no longer a cocker spaniel. But as he
gazed, his ears bald now, and uncurled, seemed to twitch. It was as if the
potent spirits of truth and laughter were whispering in them. To be
nothing-is that not, after all, the most satisfactory state in the whole
world?'
Touching, smart, extensive and difficult to put down, this book should be
read by anybody who loves a dog and certainly by those interested in the
ethical and philosophical nature of dog-human relationships.
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Emily Ballou

DeGrazia, David, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral
Status, x + 302pp. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
Is DeGrazia a sophisticated Singer? This thought arose early in reading
this book and hovered until the end. There is an attempt to build up a
different philosophy of moral respect for animals but when the practical
implications are detailed, it seems that utilitarian currents remain. For
example, in discussing the issue of the justification of zoos for their
entertainment value, DeGrazia says 'Entertainment is simply not a serious
enough benefit to justify such harms [i.e. the harms of confinement,
etc.]'.
This may be a very unfair reading of the book which has many
marvellous features. In defending a coherence model of ethical
justification, DeGrazia puts forward a series of norms which the model
must conform to: argumentative support, global illumination (a coherent
system must hang together and the system must explain how the parts
hang together), simplicity, clarity, plausibility, compatibility (or
coherence) with whatever else we know or reasonably believe. This is an
interesting list reminiscent of Kuhn's attempt to ground a position on the
justification of scientific theories See T.S. Kuhn, 'Objectivity, Value
Judgment and Theory Choice' in The Essential Tension (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977). DeGrazia goes on to state that
fallibilistic and contextual judgements about these norms constitute a
type of objectivity. This, I think, stretches the meaning of objectivity too
much but one could allow for a high level of consensus on such norms
while denying there is any objectivity here. In support of his coherence
theory, DeGrazia says that 'an incoherent opinion, position, or theory is
not reasonable; it does not make sense' (page 18). This is a problematic
claim. There is equivocation on 'incoherent'. If he means by 'incoherent',
a position which violates his theoretical norms such a position could still
make sense. If he means 'nonsense' by the term 'incoherent' then of
course an incoherent position does not make sense but this is not the
same as saying that the position violates his theoretical norms.
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In addition, DeGrazia defends 'a modified notion of impartiality or
universalizability recognizing feminist and other criticisms of this
notion'. He doesn't handle these criticisms entirely satisfactorily. In
response to writers such as Gilligan who suggest that care may be a
higher value than impartiality at least for some people, DeGrazia says
that he isn't arguing that the care perspective is invalid just that it is
insufficient. There is still a conflict with Gilligan. Her arguments have
not been met. Also in the statement of the universalizability principle
which DeGrazia accepts it is not clear how these criticisms have been
recognized: 'Universalizability and formal justice imply that we should
grant equal moral weight or importance to everyone's (relevantly
similar) interests,unless there is a relevant difference between the beings
in question '. Perhaps if more work is done on the notion of 'relevant
difference' a possible resolution of this debate might emerge.
DeGrazia makes a further move in Chapter 3 arguing that the theoretical
virtues of the coherence model favour equal consideration of animals.
There is careful exploration of what this might mean. Chapters 4 to 6
deal with the mental life of animals as DeGrazia believes this study is
necessary to determine which animals have 'basic moral status' and
whether there are morally significant differences among beings with
moral status. In these chapters he draws on human phenomenology,
research in animal behaviour, functional-evolutionary arguments and
physiological evidence. Human phenomenology is discussed as
DeGrazia believes that we have good reason to think that many animals
have minds whose contents are not wholly dissimilar to the contents of
human minds. He states that human phenomenology sets the agenda for
what kinds of mental states to look for in animals, a human-centred
approach with obvious plausibility. Nevertheless I think that we should
be open to the possibility that there are animal mental states which are
different from human ones which could be a basis for according moral
status.
The appropriateness of using the other three types of evidence is given a
strong defence. For DeGrazia, taking animals seriously requires taking
their minds seriously. So it is necessary to consider the empirical data on
animal minds. An excellent summary of this data follows. It points to the
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following conclusions amongst others: that we can attribute pain and
consciousness generally to most or all vertebrates and probably at least
some invertebrates, e.g. cephalopods; (consciousness is accepted as a
sufficient but not necessary condition for mentation and it is
distinguished from self-consciousness) and we can attribute anxiety,
fear, suffering and pleasure to most or all vertebrates and possibly a few
invertebrates. Most or all vertebrates can think. Some animals have a
sense of time and grizzly bears, Great apes, lesser apes, elephants and
dolphins have self-awareness. After a careful exploration of what it is
that constitutes language, DeGrazia concludes that dolphins and sea lions
can master certain syntactic and semantic rules. Chimpanzees, bonobos
and gorillas have a range of linguistic capacities. He then draws the
general conclusion that 'some apes and cetaceans have used, and many of
their conspecifics can do doubt learn, certain forms of language'.
DeGrazia provides a short but convincing argument for the claim that at
least some animals are moral agents, a quite novel position but one that is
receiving some empirical support.
The principle of equal consideration defended requires that equal moral
weight be given to relevantly similar interests. After surveying standard
forms of value theory for humans, DeGrazia supports a subjectivist
position. He argues that all and only sentient beings have interests (based
on his coherence theory). There is an extended discussion of the possible
harm of death to animals, an issue which is generally not given enough
attention. Although his conclusion is tentative he agrees that 'normal
humans who are not thoroughly miserable and hopeless lose more from
dying than do many animals with moral status (at least from fish through
birds).'
The principle of equal consideration requires that equal moral weight or
importance be given to relevantly similar interests no matter who has
them. Some implications of this principle are: a prima facie duty not to
do harm to sentient beings; and a duty not to kill, disable or confine
sentient animals unnecessarily. Some further practical consequences
include a condemnation of factory farming, fishing, and the practices in
most zoos as ethically indefensible.
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I would like to see more argument on the point that it is only sentient
beings who have interests and deserve moral consideration. It is easy to
say along with DeGrazia that nonsentient animals, species or ecosystems
don't have 'relevantly similar interests' but why then do I feel a moral
repugnance at the devastation currently being visited upon coral reefs or
native forests around the world? Is this simply misplaced?
There are some curious omissions in this book. Ted Benton's Natural
Relations is not mentioned. Nor is the work of Greta Gaard, Lori Gruen
or Linda Birke. There is almost no discussion of animal experimentation
which is very odd given the strong defence of vegetarianism. However
Taking Animal Seriously does contain a wealth of well-worked out
discussion on an impressively wide range of issues in animal ethics. It
would make an excellent text for a course in this area.
Denise
Russell
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BOOK NOTES
Linzey, Andrew, Animal Theology, vii +214pp., Illinois Press, 1995.
Many of the chapters in this book have been in the public domain for a
few years as conference papers, journal articles or lectures but they still
constitute a fresh Christian perspective on animals, confronting the view
often read into Christianity that animals are in the world for human use.
The first part of the book is about establishing Christian principles which
relate to animals. These principles turn out to imply some direct moral
duties. The second half of Animal Theology contains an elaboration of
these principles. Vegetarianism is defended. Animal experimentation,
hunting and genetic engineering are all condemned with arguments
which work well given Linzey's basic assumptions but they don't engage
with the challenges of different views a great deal.
Beck, Alan and Katcher, Aaron, Between Pets and People: The
Importance of Animal Companionship, revised edition, xiii + 316pp.,
Purdu University Press, Indiana, 1996.
Between Pets and People is a report of the research which Beck and
Katcher conducted on human-pet interactions. They used techniques
developed by ethologists to study animals in the wild to observe people
and pets in parks, homes and clinic waiting rooms. They also used
physiological measurement, e.g. of blood pressure and some
epidemiology of health and disease. The main research was done prior to
1983 when the first edition came out. There have been some new
additions. The book is not very technical. In fact the style is
conversational. Some accounts are fascinating but many readers will
wish for more depth.
Bavidge, Michael and Ground, Ian, Can we understand animal minds?
vii + 176pp., Bristol Classical Press, London, 1994.
'Mind' here is taken to refer to 'that range of capacities, states and
processes which constitute the living experience of a creature' or the
animal's point of view on the world. No mental entity is posited. Debates
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in the animal sciences concerning the subjective experiences of animals
are outlined followed by a quick run-through of various philosophical
theories of mind. There is an attempt to defuse the problem of
anthropomorphism and to tackle the problem of how it is that we can
ascribe psychological concepts to non-language using animals. The
concept of expression is employed. Can we understand animal minds is
a good, fast read. This is also not a 'deep' book but it does present some
fresh insights and neatly cuts off many dead ends in philosophy of mind.
Groves, Julian McAllister, Hearts and Minds: The controversy over
laboratory animals viii + 230pp., Temple University Press, Philadelphia,
1997.
Groves is not offering a new moral theory from which we can draw
conclusions concerning ethics and animal experimentation. His aim is to
describe how certain people feel about such research and their reflections
on these feelings. The people in the study are from a 'mid-size college
town' in the United States. They are animal rights activists and animal
research supporters. It is probably fair to say the sample is representative
of activists and research supporters in other Western countries. Hearts
and Minds does highlight the complexity of attitudes and feelings on
both sides of this divide. Yet Groves thinks that the two groups are not
as different as they have been made out to be with regards to their
feelings about animals.
The final chapter contains a discussion of the problems with federal and
institutional guidelines for laboratory animal welfare. This is certainly an
area which needs much more consideration along with the broader
questions concerning regulation of animal research and promotion of
alternatives. The existence of institutional guidelines and ethics
committees often leads to unwarranted complacency.
.
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Announcements
The Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare will be
published by Greenwood Press and it is tentatively scheduled for release
in early 1998. Edited by Marc Bekoff of the University of Colorado this
one volume reference work will provide essays from recognized
authorities in the field addressing the many issues of animal rights and
animal welfare. The forward is written by Jane Goodall. For more
information contact Marc Bekoff, EPO Biology, University of Colorado,
Boulder,
Colorado,
80309-0334,
U.S.A.
email:
marc.bekoff@colorado.edu
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